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Network Defense: Pruning, Grafting, and Closing to Prevent Leakage of 
Strategic Knowledge to Rivals 
 
 
Abstract: We explore how firms protect themselves from the risks of knowledge spillover to 
indirectly connected rivals in a network of interorganizational ties. We argue that the safeguards 
to limit opportunistic behavior by directly linked firms in a dyad, which have been the focus of 
extant research, are insufficient to overcome extra-dyadic leakage risks. Instead, firms terminate 
or avoid ties that expose their knowledge to indirectly linked rivals (pruning and grafting) and 
embed themselves in dense networks (closing) to prevent strategic knowledge spillover. Through 
a longitudinal study of German board interlocks during 1990-2003, we find that firms are more 
likely to prune, graft, and close their networks as they accumulate strategic knowledge and as the 
firms to which they are interlocked increasingly generate indirect ties to competitors, even when 
controlling for dyadic safeguards discussed by prior research. We capture strategic knowledge by 
tracking firms’ experience in the former Warsaw Pact countries from immediately after the 
sudden fall of communism in 1990 until 2003. The study introduces indirect links to rivals as a 
source of knowledge spillover in networks, shows how firms deal with extra-dyadic risks, and 
provides a defensive explanation for the evolution of network composition and structure.   
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In 2006, George Keyworth resigned from the board of directors of Hewlett-Packard 
amidst allegations of leaking information on the firm’s long-term strategy (Murray, 2006) 
 
In 2009, the CEO of Google, Erich Schmidt, stepped down from Apple’s board due 
increasing rivalry between the two firms (Stone, 2009)  
 
Between 2009 and 2012, rivals AT&T and Sprint were indirectly linked to each other 
when Laura T. Tyson (director at AT&T) and James H. Hance, Jr. (director at Sprint) both 
served on the board of Morgan Stanley (Morgan Stanley, 2010) 
 
Interorganizational ties transmit knowledge that can be leveraged to make strategic 
decisions, develop capabilities, and scan the competitive landscape (e.g. Beckman & Haunschild, 
2002; Gulati, 2007). Yet as the opening examples suggest, they can also be conduits of undesired 
knowledge leakage because partners may, opportunistically or inadvertently, obtain and transmit 
firms’ confidential information. A strand of research has focused on the defenses firms adopt to 
prevent the downsides of interorganizational ties. These defenses include legal tools such as 
contracting or intellectual property rights (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 2008; Mayer & 
Salomon, 2006; Oxley & Sampson, 2004), social mechanisms like trust or structural 
embeddedness (Hallen, Katila, & Rosenberger, 2013; Polidoro, Ahuja, & Mitchell, 2011; Zaheer, 
McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), and other strategic choices such as timing or geographic colocation 
(Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012; Hallen et al., 2013; Katila et al., 2008). This work has provided a 
better understanding of how organizations protect their knowledge in interfirm partnerships.  
We build upon but depart from these precedents in two ways. First, while research has 
emphasized the risks of knowledge spillover through direct ties in a dyad (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, 
Gulati, & Nohria, 1998)—as in the case of Eric Schmidt linking Apple and Google—we place 
the spotlight on a different locus of risk arising from the broader network in which the 
partnership is embedded: indirect links to rivals. In this scenario a direct link may not be the 
problem per se but might enable leakage of the focal firm’s knowledge through second order ties 
to the focal firm’s competitors. One example is the indirect tie between AT&T and Sprint via 
Morgan Stanley mentioned in the opening vignette. Networks research has long considered the 
upsides of second order linkages (Baker, 1990; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999) but given less attention 
2	  
 
 
to their downsides (Simmel, 1950), and it has not specifically considered how firms deal with 
second order links to competitors. These links matter because firms have a strong interest in 
preventing sensitive knowledge from leaking to their rivals. While the network surrounding a 
dyad can foster learning and trust, and be a vehicle for gathering intelligence about rivals, it also 
weakens the control a firm has over its network resources. For firms that possess strategically 
sensitive knowledge, the costs of leakage to indirectly linked competitors will be especially high, 
outweighing the benefits of indirect ties discussed by prior research. In these circumstances, 
firms are likely to adopt network defenses to limit the competitive loss of strategic knowledge. 
Second, and relatedly, the defenses discussed by prior work are effective for risks posed 
by directly linked firms but may be insufficient to protect the firm against knowledge spillover to 
indirectly connected rivals. These limitations stem primarily from the lack of control a firm has 
over third parties, particularly competitors, to which it has no ties. For example, contractually 
protecting sensitive knowledge can be unusually complex when it involves a firm that is not a 
party in the contract, or social sanctions may be overpowered by competitive incentives. We thus 
propose that, as an alternative defense mechanism, firms will more directly modify the 
composition of the network (i.e., with whom the firm partners) or its structure (i.e., the firm’s 
position within its network). We consider three mechanisms: Network pruning and network 
grafting refer to the termination and avoidance, respectively, of ties to firms that pose a risk of 
knowledge leakage, while network closing refers to embedding the firm in a web characterized 
by dense connectivity among partners.  
We expect that pruning, grafting, and closing are most likely to occur as firms 
accumulate strategically sensitive knowledge, even when some of the defenses discussed by 
prior work are in place. To establish that indirect links to rivals are indeed a source of risk, we 
hypothesize that ties to firms creating such linkages are highly likely to be terminated in the case 
of existing relationships (pruning) and avoided when forming new ties (grafting). Indirect links 
to rivals become particularly concerning for firms accumulating experience with promising new 
strategies that lose value if competitors learn about them because the potential costs of leakage 
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begin to outweigh the benefits of indirect links to rivals. The imperative to prune and graft the 
network is thus most salient for firms with increasing levels of strategic knowledge and networks 
characterized by a growing number of indirect ties to rivals. At the same time, pruning and 
grafting may not be viable safeguards in all cases because relational, legal, or organizational 
reasons suggest that maintaining or forming a certain relationship is preferable even if it 
indirectly exposes the firm to a rival. Network closing thus becomes a complementary source of 
knowledge protection because it embeds firms in a set of dense relationships where monitoring 
of other parties is more plausible and flows of information are more circumscribed (Baker, 1990; 
Lin, 2001). We thus expect that network closure will increase over time for firms with increasing 
levels of indirect links to rivals and of strategically sensitive knowledge. Knowing when firms 
prune, graft, and close matters because, while network ties and structures dynamically change in 
general, it is less clear which ties and what conditions prompt firms to take such dramatic 
actions—particularly in the face of competitive dynamics.  
We found empirical support for our hypotheses through a longitudinal analysis of tie 
termination, tie formation, and closure in the board network of large German firms between 1990 
and 2003. We operationalized strategic knowledge by observing the accumulation of firms’ 
experience in former Warsaw Pact countries from immediately after the sudden fall of 
communism in 1990 until 2003. We observed this accumulation without left censoring because 
these markets were untapped by Western firms prior to 1990. Although the tensions that underlie 
our questions occur in a variety of networks (e.g. alliances, investment syndicates), interfirm 
board ties are a particularly amenable setting to study these issues. These ties are conduits of 
knowledge on momentous and strategically sensitive topics like acquisitions, market positioning, 
and other major investments (e.g. Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Davis & Greve, 1997; Palmer, 
Jennings, & Zhou, 1993). Since direct linkages to competitors are typically prohibited, indirect 
links are the primary sources of potential leakages to rivals. The required legal disclosures on 
director appointments allow firms to be aware of network paths to competitors, so indirect ties 
are a tangible source of risk in this context. Yet many of the safeguards used in other networks 
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are present in board ties as well—legal protections such as confidentiality agreements and 
disclosures of related business interests (Carter & Lorsch, 2004); or social mechanisms like trust 
and links to prominent partners (Davis & Mizruchi, 1999).  
This paper contributes to prior work in several ways. First, our study introduces the risks 
posed by indirect ties to rivals and the network defenses firms utilize to mitigate those risks1. 
This contrasts with prior literature focused on the potential benefits of second-order ties (e.g. 
Granovetter, 1992). Second, we show that safeguards designed for risks within dyads are 
incomplete in defending against second-order links to rivals, prompting firms to more directly 
manage the composition and structure of their networks to deal with indirect knowledge 
spillover. Third, this study demonstrates how competitive, defensive considerations that lead to 
protective behavior are drivers of network evolution. For example, it speaks to research on the 
closure of open network structures (Burt, 2002) by demonstrating that structural holes may be 
eliminated by the very firms that span them in order to secure strategic knowledge from diffusing 
to rivals. This defensive view contrasts with the tendency to explain network change as a 
function of positive motives like resource sharing or joint value creation, providing a more 
balanced consideration of the upsides and downsides of ties to the literature on network 
dynamics (e.g. Sytch & Tatarynowicz, 2013). 
Research Setting: The Opening of Eastern Europe and the German Board Network 
 After the sudden and unexpected fall of communism in 1990 Western firms had the 
opportunity to expand into untapped foreign countries with significant economic potential. 
However, those countries were essentially closed to Western investment before 1990, thereby 
increasing potential entrants’ uncertainty about the business risks in these locations. The prospect 
of entering former Warsaw Pact countries (hereafter Eastern Europe) was particularly intriguing 
for German firms in light of their proximity to the region (Marin, 2011), but companies also 
faced unforeseen cultural and institutional differences, problematic relations with local partners, 
and volatile market conditions (Flaig, 2006; Prochnow, 2004; Stevenson, 1993). Hence, 
                                                
1 At the time this paper was accepted for publication, were made aware of a related study on the negative effects of 
indirect ties to rivals on startup innovation (Cox-Pahnke, McDonald, Wang, & Hallen, 2014). 
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information about these locations was at a premium during this period.  
 Eastern Europe became a critical topic in German boardrooms, where high-level strategic 
issues were decided. As background for this study we conducted interviews with directors of 
several German firms. Directors with first-hand experience in Eastern Europe helped firms better 
assess the risks and opportunities of investments in this region and get approval for their entry 
strategies. For instance, one individual we interviewed remarked, “board members have 
experiences in specific regions and can provide input about their experiences, likely problems, 
etc. Therefore, there are often discussions in the boardroom where board members share their 
regional experience.” Another one stated: “…one of the most important tasks of a board member 
is to ask the right questions… Experience in these markets helps you to ask the right questions.” 
Even more to the point, one board chairperson stated: “You cannot expect the CEO to come to 
the board and say we could go to … a former Warsaw Pact country or to someplace in Central 
Europe – let’s discuss the alternatives… There will be a regional strategy, and it is the result of 
a process within the company; the strategy will not have been crafted by or even decided by the 
CEO himself… However, given helpful input from the board, there may be new thoughts added 
to a regional strategy.” 
The types of knowledge about Eastern Europe that were transferred via the network can 
be broken in a few categories. One had to do with the process of investing in a transition 
economy: dealing with legal hurdles, establishing connections to new suppliers or customers, or 
adapting to cultural and other practices. Another subject had to do with market conditions: 
business and political risks, growth opportunities, and local competition. In addition, executives 
and directors wanted to know how Eastern European activities fit with domestic operations (e.g., 
labor relations). A good portion of the knowledge was regional in nature because all the 
countries inherited some of the institutional infrastructure of the former Soviet Union. Yet 
differences within the region were significant, as some countries like the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, and Latvia reformed quickly while others showed less interest in moving towards 
capitalism (Iankova, 2002). The early reformers often invested in their infrastructure and 
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educational system, thus making these markets more attractive for foreign investments. In 
addition to the speed of transition, the logic of reform itself differed across countries and created 
heterogeneity in the emphasis on social vs. market imperatives, openness to foreign assistance, 
and other factors (Orenstein, 2001).  
The knowledge necessary to invest in these countries was highly tacit and hence more 
easily transmitted through the rich medium of a personal board connection (Daft & Lengel, 
1986; Kogut & Zander, 1992). There was one more type of information that was more codifiable 
but no less important: knowing what plans a firm had in the region, in particular a competitor’s 
expansion strategy. All of these types of knowledge were sensitive in nature and worth 
protecting. Our interviewees revealed that firms are careful to safeguard such strategic 
knowledge from leaking to competitors through the board network. For example, one director 
stated, “We need to protect our knowledge. There are only very few firms in our field of business. 
However, we still have to have safeguards in place.”  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Knowledge Protection and Indirect Network Ties 
 Ties between organizations are viewed as the plumbing through which organizations can 
learn from each other (Levitt & March, 1988; Podolny, 2001). Research demonstrates that 
networks reduce the cost of searching for relevant knowledge and enable knowledge transfer 
across organizational boundaries (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Mizruchi, 1996), influencing a 
range of positive outcomes such as innovation (Ahuja 2000), strategic choice (Haunschild, 
1994), and performance (Zaheer & Bell 2005). However, network ties can also impair the 
strategic value of the firm’s knowledge because, once disclosed to a partner or exposed to the 
broader network, knowledge is hard to protect from further diffusion and loses its uniqueness 
(Arrow, 1974; Dushnitsky & Shaver, 2009; Katila et al., 2008). Thus firms face a tension 
between the benefits and risks of participating in interorganizational networks. 
A body of research in this domain focuses on the safeguards firms establish to protect 
their knowledge from unwanted diffusion, particularly to competitors. Legal tools such as 
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contracting, governance modes, limiting scope, or intellectual property rights help anticipate or 
adjudicate problems that arise after tie formation (e.g. Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Mayer & 
Salomon, 2006; Katila et al., 2008). Social mechanisms including trust, ties to central partners, or 
relational and structural embeddedness mitigate hazards through social control (e.g. Hallen et al., 
2013; Polidoro et al., 2011; Zaheer et al. 1998). Other strategic safeguards include the timing of 
alliance formation, goal adjustment, and geographic colocation (e.g. Katila et al. 2008; Diestre & 
Rajagopalan, 2012; Hallen et al., 2013). Empirical papers often explain how certain safeguards 
impact tie formation or some type of performance outcome. These important precedents have 
two commonalities. First, they focus on the risks of knowledge leakage within the dyad. A direct 
partner represents a real source of concern because it may behave opportunistically or be a direct 
competitor in the marketplace (e.g. Hamel, 1991; Polidoro et al. 2011). Second, and relatedly, 
the defenses proposed by this work are mainly designed to mitigate risks within the dyad. For 
example, a contract can be written with the direct partner because it is a party to the transaction, 
or over time trust can develop by repeatedly working together (Gulati, 1995).  
Yet risks of unwanted knowledge leakage also lie in the broader network in which the 
dyad is embedded. Namely, firms can be exposed to competitors when their first-order partners 
establish second order paths to their rivals. We are not the first to point out the existence or 
relevance of second order ties. The entire literature on social networks is predicated on the idea 
that the structure surrounding a dyad matters (e.g. Simmel 1950). Research on tie formation and 
dissolution discusses the role of structural embeddedness, where linkages to common third 
parties provide social control that makes parties feel safer and more trusting, lending cohesion 
and stability to the relationship (e.g. Granovetter, 1992; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999; Polidoro et al. 
2011). And work on knowledge transfer via networks is based on the fact that network paths 
beyond the dyad are essential for the diffusion of information and interorganizational learning 
(Burt, 1992; Podolny, 2001). From a competition standpoint, indirect links may help a focal firm 
gain useful intelligence about rivals’ knowledge and strategies. In most cases, research focuses 
on the positive outcomes of these second or third order ties. However, while indirect linkages in 
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general may be beneficial, if they link a focal firm to a rival they can be dangerous from a 
knowledge standpoint because they increase the risk that the firm’s strategic knowledge will leak 
to an undesired recipient. This risk may not be a concern if the defensive mechanisms to keep 
direct partners in check were effective in preventing second order leakage. We explore reasons 
why this may not always be the case by studying conditions under which the costs of indirect ties 
outweigh their benefits. 
 Board Interlock Networks. We study how competitive tension plays out in a network of 
board interlocks. Boardroom discussions often focus on high-level, momentous strategic issues 
that determine the direction, scope, and success of the firm. Directors have a duty to carefully 
consider these issues and offer competent advice (Westphal, 1999). The network of board ties is 
an important source of vicarious learning for firms because board members with experience in 
specific domains have a high degree of credibility (e.g. Davis & Greve, 1997; Tuschke, Sanders, 
& Hernandez, 2014). These patterns of learning and practice diffusion imply that firms 
possessing knowledge face some degree of spillover risk through their board networks (Murray, 
2006), though research has not systematically explored this possibility. Managers and directors 
involved in the board network are aware of the various linkages they create. In the process of 
being vetted, potential new directors must report any other boards on which they serve. After the 
appointment, firms are required to disclose the names of their executives and directors, the 
employment relationships of every officer, and the current directorships the individual holds. In 
addition, the network of board ties among large firms is a rather small, elite world in which 
awareness of ‘who serves where’ is quite high. Thus the opportunities for knowledge exchange 
and leakage are real in this kind of network. 
 Strategic Experience and Knowledge. Because this study focuses on experience in 
Eastern Europe as an indicator of strategic knowledge, we theoretically establish the connection 
between experience and knowledge. We draw on the behavioral theory of the firm, which defines 
organizational learning as the systematic change in a firm’s knowledge base occurring as a 
function of prior experience (Argote, 1999). Our study is concerned with knowledge that is 
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strategic (vs. technical) in nature, enabling firms to engage in actions that influence growth and 
performance. The behavioral theory has a well-validated notion that, while knowledge per se is 
unobservable, experience with an issue is a very strong proxy for knowledge (e.g. Levitt & 
March, 1988). Firms obtain and accumulate knowledge through experience, by which they 
develop understanding, routines, and resources related to a particular domain of action (Nelson 
& Winter, 1982). As research on experiential learning has shown, knowledge gained from 
experience can be applied to future challenges and opportunities similar in nature to prior actions 
(e.g. Amburgey & Miner, 1992). Based on these theoretical foundations, we define strategic 
knowledge as the information and know-how embodied in a firm’s accumulated experience with 
a strategic issue—which we operationalize as foreign experience in Eastern Europe. 
We propose that strategic experience gained outside of the network domain also has value 
because it is a resource prized by other network participants. The experiential learning of one 
firm becomes the potential source of vicarious learning for another (Argote & Miron-Spektor, 
2011). Network ties such as board interlocks are the most powerful channels through which 
vicarious learning occurs because they bring together individuals who share experiences, advice, 
and know-how. If the knowledge embodied in the first-hand experience of a firm is valuable not 
just for future learning but also because other network participants prize it, such knowledge is 
threatened when the odds of it leaking to an undesirable receiver are high.  
HYPOTHESES 
We begin by establishing a baseline expectation about how knowledge affects tie 
dissolution and formation. Accumulating strategic knowledge gives rise to two opposing 
imperatives. On the one hand, the firm has a network resource that it does not want its rivals to 
obtain (e.g. Katila et al. 2008). On the other hand, the firm is a more attractive potential partner 
because of its valuable know-how (Ahuja, 2000). Tie terminations occur as the firm eliminates 
connections that pose a threat to its accumulated knowledge, while tie additions occur as the firm 
gains opportunities for new partnerships. In a board network, this happens as firms change the 
composition of their boards or as the firm’s managers—who have first-hand experience with the 
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strategic issue—become attractive directors for other firms. We are agnostic about the ratio of 
terminations to additions or whether one leads to the other, and only expect that both will 
increase. This idea is not original to our study but we deem it important to connect our paper to 
previous work (Katila et al. 2008, Polidoro et al. 2011). We thus present the following baseline 
hypothesis: as firms accumulate strategic experience (e.g. Eastern European market entry), their 
board networks will manifest greater churn through more tie terminations and additions. 
Pruning and Grafting 
 The core question we address is how firms protect knowledge from diffusing to rivals 
beyond the dyad. Second order links threaten the strategic value of a firm’s knowledge because 
indirect, bridging ties are the primary conduits of diffusion beyond the firm’s immediate 
relationships (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992). The literature on knowledge transfer emphasizes 
the role of network paths beyond the dyad as crucial transmission channels, and empirical studies 
on interorganizational ties provide support for this idea (Bell & Zaheer, 2007; Rosenkopf & 
Almeida, 2003). For firms seeking knowledge, the broader network is a valuable source of 
learning opportunities and of intelligence about rivals. But from the perspective of the possessor 
of strategic knowledge, the broader network can also become a source of unwanted exposure. 
While not all second order paths are inherently risky, firms are sensitive to those that lead to 
competitors because the advantage they may have in the marketplace depends on the inability of 
rivals to tap into the firms’ knowledge or replicate its actions (e.g. Grant, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 
1992). For instance, research shows that leakage of sensitive knowledge through indirect ties is 
detrimental to firm innovation (Cox-Pahnke et al., 2014). Hence, firms are likely to take actions 
to prevent indirect ties to rivals from undermining their strategic knowledge. 
 While concerns about collusion prohibit or strongly discourage direct links to competitors 
through board interlocks, indirect ties to rivals are not uncommon and pose the primary threat in 
this type of network. We already provided one illustration in the introduction with the case of 
AT&T and Sprint being linked through Morgan Stanley. Another example is the case of Lowe’s 
and Home Depot between 2007 and 2011: Stephen Page, a director at Lowe’s at that time (2003-
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2011) served as director at Liberty Mutual Insurance between 2001 and 2012. Between 2007 and 
2011, Annette Verschuren, a senior officer of Home Depot (1996-2011), also served on the 
board of Liberty Mutual Insurance, thus creating an indirect link between rivals. These two 
examples correspond to the solid arrows in Figure 1, which also illustrates general ways in which 
indirect links among competitors can happen. For instance, the dashed arrows show how a top 
manager of Firm B could be on the board of firm Z with an independent director who also serves 
on the board of B’s rival (firm A).  
 ------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
------------------------------------ 
 Our interviews with directors and managers revealed that they are aware of and seek to 
avoid the threats posed by indirect ties to competitors. For example, when asked about the role of 
indirect ties in establishing new interlocks, one Chairman responded: “of course, ties to 
competitors play an important role. We try not to establish links to competitors.” When asked to 
clarify whether this referred specifically to indirect ties, he said: “As I said, we are very cautious 
in this respect.” Strategically sensitive information in our context could refer to the sequence and 
timing of entry into different Eastern European countries or to intelligence about key suppliers or 
customers in individual host markets. Competitors from the home market might be interested in 
acquiring or in establishing an alliance with the focal firm’s partners in the target market. In the 
case of an acquisition, for example, firms are interested in preventing information about a 
potential offer from leaking to their competitors. 
We posit that firms can protect themselves from the risks of indirect links to rivals by 
modifying the composition of their ego networks through two mechanisms: pruning and grafting. 
Pruning refers to dissolving interlocks, and we argue that such an action is more likely as the 
firms to which directors connect the focal firm increasingly create paths to rivals. Dissolutions 
may occur based on mutual consent, at the request of the focal firm, or be the result of not 
renewing a directorship when it is due to expire. For instance, in the late 1990’s a top manager of 
Deutsche Bank stepped down from the board of Thyssen after it was deemed that he posed a risk 
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of transmitting sensitive information to Krupp—Thyssen’s rival—during a takeover attempt (Der 
Spiegel, 1997). Grafting refers to creating new interlocks by appointing directors that establish 
new links to other firms. The risks of indirect links to rivals are salient at the time of tie 
formation, when firms seek to avoid interlocks that create conflicts with rivals. From a more 
constructive point of view, firms are more likely to approve new interlocks to firms that generate 
relatively few indirect ties to rivals. We label these actions as network pruning and grafting 
because they reflect a defensive decision that alters the composition of the firm’s network. 
 While firms have reasonable latitude to prune and graft, eliminating an existing tie or 
avoiding a new one because it creates indirect links to rivals is a rather drastic decision and many 
other considerations could be at play. One could argue that the dyadic legal, social, and strategic 
defenses studied by prior research are sufficient to protect from the risks of second order paths to 
rivals. For instance, contracts contain clauses about confidentiality or fiduciary responsibility 
that cover the transmission of knowledge to third parties. And trust is a powerful social 
mechanism that reduces opportunism. Longstanding friendships and commitments may be 
violated and valuable sources of learning eliminated when ties are terminated, and forming a new 
tie may be justified if the new partner brings resources that compensate for second order 
exposure to rivals. These considerations are warranted and form a valid null to our hypotheses. 
Yet there is a different degree of control when it comes to the behaviors of directly linked firms 
versus contingencies arising from the broader network. For example, contracts can only be 
written between parties directly involved in a task and are difficult to enforce when it comes to a 
third party. And research has discussed the difficulty of contractually protecting knowledge with 
strategic and tacit attributes (e.g. Kogut & Zander, 1992). High trust between two firms does not 
preclude trust between one of the firms and a third party over which the focal firm has little 
control, which is troublesome when that third party is a rival. Hence, although the defensive 
mechanisms discussed by prior work are useful, additional risks arise when looking beyond the 
dyad that may require more drastic defenses.  
 We are agnostic about the motivations of network participants and do not assume 
13	  
 
 
malicious or opportunistic intent. In fact, a firm’s knowledge can be compromised inadvertently. 
For instance, a director might unknowingly reveal sensitive information as s/he ‘switches hats’ in 
supervising different firms throughout the network, or the simple appearance of conflicts of 
interest despite individual integrity may be sufficient to affect tie formation or dissolution. 
Defenses like contracts and trust may be less effective against inadvertent leakage, whereas 
pruning and grafting are more secure in this regard. In addition, while linkages to competitors are 
thought to reduce competitive uncertainty through tacit collusion or mutual forbearance 
(Gimeno, 2004), these considerations must be weighed against the risk of undermining the 
strategic value of knowledge. Thus we are also agnostic as to the baseline level of ‘acceptable’ 
forbearance that firms desire. Rather, the threshold of what is considered acceptable changes as 
various risks—including knowledge spillover—accumulate over time. 
 
H1a: The more indirect links to the focal firm’s competitors an existing interlock with 
another firm creates, the greater the likelihood that the interlock to that firm will be 
terminated. 
 
H1b: The fewer indirect links to the focal firm’s competitors a potentially new interlock 
with another firm creates, the greater the likelihood that an interlock to that firm will be 
established. 
So far we have held the amount of knowledge a firm possesses constant, which leaves 
open the possibility that indirect links to rivals affect tie terminations and additions for reasons 
unrelated to knowledge. Yet our theoretical interest is in how firms seek to protect their strategic 
knowledge, and firms develop experience with a given strategic issue at different rates. Per the 
baseline expectation, the fear that something valuable might leak and the competitive 
consequences of such leakage increase as the firm accumulates knowledge worth protecting—in 
our setting, as the firm obtains experience in transition economies. The more knowledge firms 
accumulate, the more likely that indirect links to competitors will be associated with tie 
terminations and that new ties with firms producing high levels of exposure to competitors will 
be avoided. This joint effect—high experience and high indirect links—indicates a significant 
risk of undesirable knowledge spillover. The potential for leakage becomes more real when the 
focal firm has more of something valuable to lose and many network paths making that possible 
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loss probable—the benefits of indirect ties are outweighed by the risk of undesired outflows of 
knowledge. This logic leads to the following hypotheses: 
 
H2a: The positive relationship between the indirect links to the focal firm’s competitors 
generated by an existing interlock with another firm and the likelihood that the interlock 
to that firm will be terminated (per H1a) will increase as the firm accumulates strategic 
experience (e.g., Eastern European market entry). 
 
H2b: The negative relationship between the indirect links to the focal firm’s competitors 
generated by a potentially new interlock with another firm and the likelihood that the 
interlock to that firm will be established (per H1b) will increase as the firm accumulates 
strategic experience (e.g., Eastern European market entry). 
Network Closing 
Several constraints complicate the considerations involved in unilaterally pruning and 
grafting board ties for a single reason such as preventing an indirect link to a rival. These include 
personal relationships between executives and directors (e.g. Westphal, 1999), relational or 
structural embeddedness that makes it hard to terminate a relationship without suffering 
reputational penalties (e.g. Hallen et al. 2013), legal contracts that limit the flexibility to 
terminate a tie, or a desire to maintain or establish a tie to a firm that provides valuable vicarious 
learning (e.g. Beckman & Haunschild, 2002). In light of these considerations, we propose that 
firms can still safeguard strategic knowledge even when indirect ties to competitors cannot be 
eliminated or avoided. Firms can accomplish this by seeking to embed themselves in a closed, 
dense network in which social monitoring is more prevalent and knowledge diffusion is more 
circumscribed (e.g. Lin, 2001). The extent of network closure or openness has received a great 
deal of attention in research because these positions give rise to different kinds of benefits (Burt, 
2005). Our contribution to this work is to point out that closure can function as a defensive 
network tool when risks of unwanted knowledge spillover are high. Research has found that 
closure provides two types of benefits: a greater ability to transfer fine-grained, tacit knowledge 
(Ahuja, 2000) and a greater degree of social control (Coleman, 1988). Both are relevant for 
protecting knowledge from diffusing to rivals.  
The key risk posed by second order ties to rivals is that knowledge will diffuse beyond 
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the firm’s desirable circle of ties to a recipient that competes directly with the firm in the market. 
This risk can be mitigated when there is a high degree of agreement among all firms in an ego 
network regarding acceptable behavior and when the firm can more easily monitor those 
behaviors. These conditions facilitate social control by allowing the firm to exert reputational 
and normative pressures on other firms to protect its interests (e.g. Coleman, 1988; Lin, 2001). In 
terms of knowledge control, information within densely linked networks tends to be more 
homogenous and circumscribed (e.g. Burt, 1992; Ahuja, 2000). This could be a disadvantage 
when firms seek to expand their knowledge and creativity, but is beneficial from a defensive 
standpoint. Because the knowledge of the firm is contained within a tighter set of ties, 
monitoring its diffusion is easier than if the firm’s network were more open. Echoing these ideas, 
Lin (2001: 27) makes an important distinction between the objectives of preserving and 
obtaining resources in networks and concludes that “for preserving or maintaining 
resources…denser networks may have an advantage” over more open networks. 
To benefit from this kind of knowledge protection, a firm experiencing an increasing 
threat of unwanted knowledge leakage to rivals will be more likely to engage in behaviors that 
increase ego network closure. Closure is a complex structural arrangement that depends on the 
motivations and actions of multiple network actors, so firms have a significantly weaker ability 
to orchestrate closure than to prune and graft. However, the influence they do have over closure 
in board interlock networks comes from the ongoing process of director appointments and 
departures. If this process were random, we would expect no discernible effect on the network 
structure. But in a setting in which there is a strong motivation to protect strategic knowledge 
from leaking to rivals, decisions about directorships are not random. Instead, firms will increase 
their reliance on their existing, trusted circle of interlock network ties to manage the risk of 
losing valuable knowledge (Uzzi, 1999; Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004). This is 
manifested in two ways that increase closure. 
When it comes to filling vacancies or appointing new directors, a common way to rely on 
existing relationships is to exchange referrals with existing directors and managers in the current 
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board network. Research documents that such referral seeking and giving is indeed one of the 
important mechanisms explaining board tie formation (Koskinen & Edling, 2012; McDonald & 
Westphal, 2010; Useem, 1984). The reliance on trusted referrals is particularly salient when the 
need to protect (instead of seek) knowledge is paramount, and will be more likely to produce a 
denser web of relations because it reinforces ties amongst the firms’ immediate, pre-existing 
relations. A manager who serves on the board of another firm may, for instance, rely on trusted 
members of that board to solicit referrals for a vacant directorship at her own firm. Often, the 
suggested candidates will not only be personally known to those who refer them but will also be 
linked to them through interlocks. A similar reasoning applies to director departures. Given the 
constraints firms have over unilaterally ending ties, the focal firm has the most social and 
strategic latitude in ending linkages to other firms that are more isolated from its existing core of 
well-established relationships. These peripheral firms (in the focal firm’s ego network) are also 
socially difficult to monitor, and their elimination thus reinforces closure amongst the core circle 
of interlock relations. These dynamics of director appointments and departures are not the same 
as pruning and closing as in H1-H2 because they do not refer to eliminating or avoiding those 
creating indirect links to rivals. Instead, they apply to any linkage that can reinforce the existing 
set of trusted ties amongst the focal firms’ network of non-rivals—even and especially in the 
presence of indirect links to rivals2. Hence, they are an additional defensive layer to ‘seal off’ the 
network against unwanted knowledge leakage. 
As before, we view the risk of leakage arising from two conditions. Organizations 
accumulating strategic experience have a greater imperative to be protective. However, the 
baseline hypothesis suggests that knowledge accumulation increases tie additions and 
terminations and both could affect network closure, so its independent effect on closure is 
unclear. But high strategic knowledge levels coupled with increasing numbers of indirect links to 
competitors make it more probable that the firm’s knowledge will fall into undesirable hands and 
                                                
2 We are not speaking of the firm orchestrating linkages involving its rivals, such as asking a director tied to a non-
rival firm to create a tie to a rival firm, or to encourage linkages between two of the focal firms rivals. We are 
referring to appointing and ending directorships among the firm and its non-rival firms to which there are pre-
existing interlocks in the ego network. 
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strongly prompts the firm be protective, pushing it to try and close its network. Thus we propose 
the following interaction effect: 
 
H3: As firms accumulate strategic experience (e.g., Eastern European market entry), 
their ego networks become more closed as the firms to which they are interlocked 
generate more indirect links to the focal firms’ rivals. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
In the German corporate governance system, companies with publicly traded shares have 
a two-tier board structure comprising a supervisory board (“Aufsichtsrat”) and a management 
board (“Vorstand”). The supervisory board plays the same role as the board of directors in the 
U.S., while the management board is equivalent to U.S. top management teams. Officers from 
the management board cannot serve on the supervisory board of their own firm, but they can be 
directors in the supervisory boards of other organizations. The supervisory boards of large firms 
are usually composed of top executives from other firms (i.e., members of other firms’ 
management boards) and non-executive experts. Both boards work together closely to craft and 
develop firm strategy and the supervisory board meets in concert with the regular meetings of the 
supervisory board. As in other Western governance systems, the management board is 
accountable for operational and strategic decision-making. Unlike in the U.S., the size of the 
supervisory board is legally dictated according to firm size. Yet research has demonstrated that 
ideas, strategies, and policies diffuse through German board networks in much the same was as 
they do in other contexts (Sanders & Tuschke, 2007), which was validated through our 
interviews with German executives and directors. 
Qualitative Information from Interviews 
We conducted nine interviews with members of German supervisory boards during 2009-
2010, four of which specifically addressed Eastern European strategy. These were well-
positioned individuals, such as CEOs or the Chairperson of one of the five largest firms in 
Germany, and were well acquainted with the context and the time period. The purpose was to 
learn how strategic knowledge—and the subject of Eastern Europe in particular—was transferred 
through board ties and how this might impact the network. The meetings were exploratory in 
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nature; we make no claims that these interviews constituted a qualitative or grounded theory 
study in and of themselves. As the quotes included earlier in the paper show, the clear thrust of 
the responses was that discussions of Eastern Europe definitely took place in the boardroom, that 
they were important during this period, and that the protection of strategic knowledge (from 
indirect links to rivals) was relevant. We also interviewed four board members of U.S. Fortune 
500 companies in 2013, including two former CEOs. Three firms had entered at least one 
country in Eastern Europe. Such interviews helped us understand if what we observed in 
Germany was applicable to other settings. The meetings suggested that emerging market entry 
was indeed a topic of discussion in U.S. boards, that directors eagerly attempt to learn from each 
other, that regional strategies are a key element of a firm’s overall strategy, and that firms are 
protective of their knowledge regarding such strategies. 
Quantitative Data for Empirical Analysis 
We obtained yearly data on the board interlocks of German firms and their experience in 
Eastern Europe between 1990 and 2003 based on the dataset used by Tuschke, Sanders, and 
Hernandez (2014). The sampling frame consisted of firms listed in the DAX 100—an index of 
the largest publicly traded German corporations. These firms are the most likely to have the 
resources to engage in risky foreign investments and are the most involved in the German 
interlock structure (Jürgens, Naumann, & Rupp, 2000). To ensure that we observed firms with 
latitude in forming board ties and making FDI decisions, we removed seven that were 
subsidiaries of other firms. For the remaining companies, we obtained data on foreign 
investments in the 21 former Warsaw Pact countries3. Since our sample begins in 1990, the 
foreign experience data basically avoids left censoring because only four firms had invested (to a 
very limited extent) behind the iron curtain prior to 1990. Thus we assess how the network 
evolves in response to experience in a well-controlled setting by encompassing a period during 
which knowledge went from virtually non-existent to more widely available. 
                                                
3 The 21 countries are: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Romania, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Tadzhikistan, 
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. 
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We triangulated from multiple sources to get information on firms’ investments in 
Eastern Europe. We began with annual reports, where some organizations provide a complete list 
of ownership shares in foreign subsidiaries. However, large firms tend to restrict disclosure to 
selected investments. To get a more accurate count, we contacted each firm’s IR department and 
asked for detailed information on entries into the 21 countries. We also searched LexisNexis for 
press reports containing the name of the company combined with terms like ‘entry, FDI, 
investment, plant, acquisition, Eastern Europe.’ We complemented this data with information on 
each firm’s investments as reported in the Handbook of German Listed Companies. We then 
contacted the firms again and asked them to confirm or correct our information. Finally, we 
contacted the registration offices of the district courts in which firms were required to file reports 
of their foreign activities and looked at the firms’ original filings to correct inconsistencies and 
reduce missing data. This exhaustive process resulted in complete data for 71 firms compared to 
82 firms in the study by Tuschke et al. (2014). The 11 firms not included in this study were 
dropped because complete network data to calculate primary measures was unavailable. The 
majority of variables in this study differ from those in Tuschke et al. (2014) because the research 
questions differ substantially, except for four control variables that we mention below. 
Variables of Interest 
To create the network measures, we constructed 14 yearly n*n matrices, where n is the 
number of firms in any given year. The sample began with 71 firms in 1990 and ended with 68 
firms in 2003 because three companies were acquired during the period. We counted a board 
interlock between two firms when an individual affiliated with one firm’s supervisory or 
management board served on the supervisory board of another firm (Mizruchi, 1996). Firms A 
and B are assigned a value of one in the n*n matrix if an individual affiliated with A is on the 
board of B or vice versa, and assigned a value of zero otherwise. Directorships have to be 
reported in annual reports by law, so there is no missing data on board ties. In describing the 
variables in this section, we periodically refer to the firms to which a focal firm has interlocks as 
‘partners’ to preserve the technical meaning of nodes linked by ties in an interfirm network, to 
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distinguish the focal firm from other firms, and as shorthand for ‘firms linked via board 
interlocks’ to make the wording less onerous. 
Tie terminations and additions: We first analyzed the cessation or origination of ties 
between pairs of firms. The variable terminatedijt is coded as 1 if firm i and j cease having a 
board tie in year t and 0 otherwise. Ties had to be discontinued for two years or more to be 
considered terminated, since a one-year interruption did not clearly signal the intent to end the 
relationship. We observe each pair of firms with a board tie from 1990 or the year of inception 
until it is terminated. The variable addedijt is coded as 1 if firm i and j create a new board tie in 
year t and 0 otherwise. As with terminations, we only counted as additions cases in which a pair 
of firms established a tie for at least two continuous years. We observed 853 tie terminations and 
733 additions in our sample. The results are robust if we consider ties as added or terminated 
after only a single year gap. 
Network closure: We used Burt’s (1992) measure of constraint:  
𝐶i =      (𝑝ij+    𝑝iq ∗ 𝑝qi)
!
!
!
 
 In this formula, pij is the proportion of focal firm i’s total ties invested in partner firm j, 
piq is the proportion of firm i’s total ties invested in a third party q, and pqi is the proportion of 
firm q’s total ties invested in firm i. This measure captures the extent to which firm i’s direct ties 
to its partners are redundant given the number of direct ties between firm i’s alters. The variable 
ranges from zero to one, with increasing values indicating higher closure. 
Indirect competitor links (ICL): We defined rivals as firms operating in the same 
industry based on their primary 6 digit GICS code. The GICS system is akin to the SIC or 
NAICS schemes but has wider use outside the U.S. GICS codes include 10 “sectors” (2 digit), 24 
“industry groups” (4 digit), 68 “industries” (6 digit), and 154 “sub-industries” (8 digit). We opted 
for the 6-digit “industries” because they capture firms at a sufficiently detailed level so that 
categories are distinct and firms realistically compete in the same spaces (e.g. “beverages” vs. 
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“food products”).4 Our choice of 6 digit codes seems to be reasonably aligned with the notion 
that firms are prohibited from forming and seek to avoid direct board interlocks within 
industries. Only 4% of board ties in the data were between firms in the same 6-digit GICS 
industry (15% at the 2 digit level). This may represent a small degree of measurement error, but 
the results are robust if we exclude these cases from our analysis. In contrast, indirect links 
between firms in the same 6-digit industry are more common, with each exposed to an average 
of 4.5 links in their ego networks (just over 0.5 indirect links per direct partner). 
Based on this classification system, we created two measures of indirect competitor links. 
For each dyad in which i is the focal firm and j is the existing or potential firm linked via an 
interlock, we count the number of ties firm j has to firms operating in the same industry as firm i. 
To illustrate, Figure 2 shows how IWKA from the machinery industry is tied to Dyckerhoff in 
the construction materials industry. Dyckerhoff, in turn, is connected to Klöckner and Dürr, both 
of which are in the machinery industry like IWKA. Thus, Dyckerhoff generates two indirect 
competitor links for IWKA. This measure is used to test H1-H2 at the dyad level. To test H3 at 
the ego network level, we created the following measure: 
 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠  𝑡𝑜  𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠ij ∗ 𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠j
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡  𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠i
!
 
Here, indirect ties to rivalsij is the number of indirect links to focal firm i’s competitors 
created by its partner j, tiesj is the total number of direct interlocks that firm j has, and indirect 
tiesi is the total number of indirect (second order) ties that focal firm i has regardless of industry. 
This is summed for all of the focal firm’s partners. The intuition for weighting indirect 
competitor ties by tiesj is that, the more others to which firm j can disclose information, the more 
firm j compounds the baseline risk of leakage for the focal firm. The results are robust if we use 
a simpler, unweighted measure of the average indirect competitor links per interlocked partner. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
------------------------------------ 
                                                
4 We did not employ 8 digit codes because in our data the vast majority of 6 digit industries represented do not 
include more than one “sub industry” (there are 35 6-digit industries in our sample and 44 8-digit sub industries). 
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Strategic experience. We captured Eastern European (EE) experience as the logged 
number of countries in which firm i had engaged in FDI as of year t. Logging gives more weight 
to earlier experiences because those are the most formative sources of strategic knowledge 
(Argote, 1999), consistent with research on diminishing returns to learning from experience 
(Hatch & Dyer, 2004). The measure serves as a good indicator of progression along the learning 
curve. Since we do not double count entries into specific countries, firms with higher values of 
this variable have entered many different countries and possess a broader picture of what it takes 
to operate in transition economies. We verified that highly experienced firms had progressively 
moved beyond the most popular markets. Such firms should have more incentives to protect their 
accumulated experiences than their less experienced counterparts. We were initially agnostic as 
to the functional form of the experience measure and chose among several candidates using the 
Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) and Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC) as indicators of 
model fit. We considered six alternatives to our chosen measure: a count of countries entered 
(non-logged), a count of countries weighted by a linear decay function to account for 
organizational forgetting (de Holan & Phillips, 2004), a logged version of this organizational 
forgetting measure, and three separate logged counts of countries weighted by relevant target 
country characteristics (distance from Germany, GDP, and country risk). We report below on the 
robustness of our findings to these alternative measures. 
Estimation 
We are interested in two different types of dependent variables, each requiring a different 
data structure and estimator. We describe the estimation techniques before detailing the control 
variables because the types of controls and the level at which they are measured differ slightly 
for different dependent variables. All independent and control variables are lagged by a year. 
Dyadic tie changes: The first set of dependent variables operate at the dyadic level, and 
we estimated equations of the following form: 
 
Pr(terminatedijt) = β1*experienceit-1*ICLijt-1 + β2*experienceit-1 + β3*ICLijt-1 + β4*xit-1 + wij + εit-1 
 
Pr(addedijt) = β1*experienceit-1*ICLijt-1 + β2*experienceit-1 + β3*ICLijt-1+ β4*xit-1 + wij + εit-1 
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 Here, xit-1 is a set of observed covariates, wij is a set of unobserved attributes of the firm-
partner dyad, and εit-1 is a random error. Because our research question focuses on how risks 
within pairs of firms change over time, we specify a fixed effect for each unique dyad and 
estimate the parameters through a fixed-effects logit with standard errors clustered by dyad 
(Chamberlain, 1982; Greene, 2008). This stringent approach exploits within-dyad variance and 
rules out any endogenous, time invariant attribute of each dyad and firm (wij)—which matters 
because each partnership has a unique relational profile (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 1998). The 
probability of terminating or adding a tie between pairs of firms is a function of how our 
variables of interest and the controls change over time. One disadvantage of this specification is 
that dyads that do not experience a termination or addition cannot be included in the analysis. 
We compared the fixed effects model to a random effects alternative (in which no data is 
dropped) and the Hausman test strongly favored the fixed effects option (p < 0.001). We 
interpret the coefficients as applying only to dyads that exhibit an observed change, so that we 
are assessing the treatment effect on the ‘treated’ (Angrist & Pischke, 2008). 
Closure: This variable operates at the firm (ego network) level, and the equation of 
interest is as follows: 
 
Closurei,t = β1*experienceit-1*ICLit-1 + β2*experienceit-1 + β3*ICLit-1 + β4*closureit-1 + β5*xit-1 + νi + εit-1 
Once again, xit-1 is a matrix of observed control variables and εit-1 is a random error. A few 
features of this equation require consideration. First, νi is part of the error and captures any 
unobserved, time-invariant firm characteristic. If correlated with the independent variables, these 
unobserved factors produce inconsistent estimates (Wooldridge, 2002). Second, the introduction 
of a lagged dependent variable (closureit-1) is necessary to account for structural inertia but it also 
creates problems by being correlated with the random error εit-1.5 Third, ICL and its interaction 
with experience may be endogenous because unobservables dynamically affecting structure may 
be related to the level of indirect competitor links. We face the complexity of having to address 
                                                
5 This occurs because yit = β0 + β1*yi,t-1 + β2*xi,t-1 + νi + εi,t-1, and  εi,t-1 is serially correlated to εit in the original 
equation, violating the strict exogeneity assumption of traditional panel estimators (see Wooldridge, 2002: 252-256). 
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all three of the issues raised in this paragraph simultaneously—unobserved heterogeneity, an 
endogenous lagged dependent variable, and possibly endogenous regressors.  
To do so, we adopt a system GMM dynamic panel estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998). This provides a two-pronged solution to the 
concerns just raised. Consider the generic equation: yi,t = β0 + β1*yit-1 + β2*zit-1 + β3*xit-1 + νi + εit-
1. Here, yi,t is the dependent variable, yit-1 represents the lagged dependent variable, zit-1 is a 
matrix of endogenous independent variables, and xit-1 is a matrix of exogenous covariates (the 
other parameters are as already described). The first step is to take the first-difference of each 
variable, resulting in the following ‘differenced’ equation: Δyi,t = β0 + β1*Δyit-1 + β2*Δzit-1 + 
β3*Δxit-1 + Δεit-1. This differenced equation eliminates νi, thus getting rid of unobserved fixed 
effects. However, Δyit-1 (= yit-1 - yi,t-2) is still endogenous because Δεit-1 = εit-1 - εi,t-2 and the term 
εi,t-2 is correlated with yi,t-2. To solve this problem, the estimator uses older differenced lags of the 
dependent variable as instruments for Δyit-1. Thus, for example, Δyi,t-2, Δyi,t-3,…, Δyi,t-T can be 
used as instruments for Δyit-1. As long as the serial correlation between Δyit-1 and Δεit-1 goes 
beyond no more than one period, the estimates are consistent. Similarly, the endogeneity of Δzit-1 
(e.g. indirect links to competitors) is addressed by utilizing a set of lagged values of Δzit-1 (Δzi,t-2, 
Δzi,t-3, Δzit-4, etc.) as instruments. While this model may not have the virtue of including 
theoretically substantive instruments for the endogenous covariates (as in 2SLS), it does allow us 
to address multiple endogeneity concerns by exploiting the basic idea that autocorrelation 
decreases with differenced lags of any given variable. We used the maximum possible Ti – p – 2 
lags (in our case 14 – 1 – 2 = 11), where Ti is the number of years in the panel and p is the 
number of lagged DV’s included in the equation. 
Control Variables 
The controls listed in this section are included in all models unless otherwise noted. 
When a similar variable is included as a characteristic of a firm’s (actual or potential) partner at 
the dyadic level and as an attribute of the firm’s ego network, the measure at the ego network 
level is averaged across all the focal firm’s partners. For example, we control for the profitability 
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of a partner at the dyad level while in the closure model we control for the average profitability 
of all partners in the focal firm’s ego network. We also note that, since changes in composition 
and structure depend on the incentives, actions, and behaviors of the focal firm and its partner(s), 
most of the controls described are included for both sides of the relationship. 
Dyadic safeguards: We claim that the safeguards firms adopt to protect from direct 
partners’ opportunism are insufficient to protect from the risks of indirect ties to rivals, so 
accounting for these is essential. We discussed legal, social, and strategic defenses in the 
literature review. In board interlocks, protections are provided by law, contracts, and corporate 
governance codes, typically including confidentiality clauses, statements of fiduciary 
responsibility, and conditions that can trigger prosecution or the termination of the relationship 
(Aguilera, 2005). As the same laws and codes govern all firms in the sample, legal defenses are 
implicitly accounted for by the common setting. (Below we discuss mutual ownership as a legal 
mechanism common in the German context.) Some of the strategic defenses discussed in prior 
work on startups do not apply to board networks, but geographic colocation (e.g. Hallen et al. 
2013) and other unobservables are accounted for by the dyad fixed effect in our analysis. 
We control for two social safeguards considered in prior research. First, trust and loyalty 
are often proxied by the history of prior ties among firms (e.g. Gulati, 1995). Since we are 
concerned about the risks posed by indirectly linked rivals, a partner with ties to a focal firm’s 
competitors might face pressure from these firms to choose between the focal firm and them in 
terms of relative trust and loyalty. To get at this, we control for relative history, which captures 
the difference between the number of years the focal firm and the (actual or potential) partner 
have been connected and the average number of years the (actual or potential) partner and ego’s 
competitors have been connected. The more positive this variable, the greater the trust the 
partner should have in the focal firm; the more negative, the greater the trust in the focal firm’s 
competitors. Second, recent work has demonstrated that centrality can be a social protection 
because status or influence discourage third parties from behaving opportunistically for fear of 
social punishment (Hallen et al., 2013; Polidoro et al., 2011). We thus include the degree 
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centrality of the firm’s (actual or potential) partners and of the focal firm in all models. 
Centrality is correlated at high levels with other covariates in the closure models, but the results 
are robust whether it is included or not. 
Events other than the opening of Eastern Europe: We control for three events during 
the period of our study that affected board composition in Germany. The first two impacted the 
governance system. The traditional pattern of equity ownership among German firms weakened 
throughout the 1990’s. These cross-holdings were historically an important means of legal 
protection and control, so its decline may have influenced the pattern of board ties during our 
study period (Kogut & Walker, 2001). We thus included controls for equity owned by other firms 
and for the equity owned in other firms by both the focal firm and its partners, updated yearly. 
The former is measured as the percentage of a firm’s equity owned by other firms in the sample, 
and the latter captures the average equity owned by a firm in other firms within the sample. In 
addition, the period saw a strong change in emphasis toward a shareholder logic of corporate 
control (Fiss & Zajac, 2004). One of the clearest manifestations of this diffusion was the 
adoption of stock options, which was influenced by patterns of board networks (Sanders & 
Tuschke, 2007). We thus control for stock option experience, coded as 1 if a firm had adopted 
stock option compensation and zero otherwise. This measure was excluded as an attribute of the 
firm’s partners in the closure network analysis because it created multicollinearity problems. The 
third event was the occurrence of an acquisition wave (Marin, 2011), representing a strategic 
issue other than the opening of Eastern Europe about which board interlocks provided 
knowledge. We thus control for the acquisition experience of the focal firm and its partners, 
measured as the logged number of acquisitions that the firm completed in the previous five years. 
Motivations of individual directors: We included variables affecting director’s 
incentives and constraints to serve on boards. We added firm performance for both the focal and 
partner firm because directors are motivated by the prestige of serving in highly successful 
organization (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012). (Successful organizations may also have greater 
latitude to add and drop ties and influence their network structures.) Directors with significant 
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additional time commitments are more likely to leave a board and less likely to accept new 
appointments. To capture this, we adapted two measures from Boivie et al. (2012). First, the 
number of CEOs on firms’ boards is relevant because CEOs have highly demanding jobs. 
Second, we proxied for the busyness of directors on a firms’ board as the ratio of external board 
appointments held by all directors divided by the size of the board.  
Motivations of other firms: The actions of the focal firm’s direct partners or those of its 
indirectly linked competitors affect the dynamics of tie additions, deletions, and closure. In 
addition to controlling for trust, which we already described, we added several covariates. Just as 
the number of indirect links to competitors created by a firm’s partner increases the risk of 
unwanted leakage for the focal firm, the same is true of the indirect links generated by the focal 
firm for its partner. We thus controlled for indirect competitor links created by the focal firm. 
This control was not included in the ego-level analysis because its average across all partners is 
highly correlated to other covariates, though the closure results are robust to its inclusion. Since 
investing in Eastern Europe during this period was highly risky, it could be that partners sought 
to disassociate from focal firms that increasingly invested in the region because such actions 
were not legitimated. This would partially depend on the partner’s own experience with Eastern 
Europe, so we controlled for partner experience. This control is also important because, 
inasmuch as the partner has similar protective motivations to the focal firm as it accumulates 
experience, the focal firm’s network may change as a result.  
If interlocked firms develop similar experiences their knowledge will overlap and the 
focal firm or its partners may seek new ties for fresh ideas (Nakamura, Shaver, & Yeung, 1996). 
Overlap in investment choices might also signal increasing competition among partners. We thus 
controlled for the difference in the number of countries entered by the focal firm relative to its 
interlocked firms, Eastern European (EE) experience difference. We noted above that 4% of ties 
are between firms in the same 6-digit GICS code. In the dyadic analyses, this is accounted for 
through the dyad-level fixed effect. In the ego-level analysis, we accounted for this by including 
the percentage of same industry partners in the focal firm’s ego network. We also added a 
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measure of foreign sales, the firm’s ratio of international to total sales, because general 
international experience may also influence the firm’s and its partner’s network opportunities 
given our focus on foreign market knowledge.6 Of all the control variables listed in this section, 
four are also included in the study by Tuschke et al. (2014): firm profitability, foreign sales, focal 
firm degree centrality (‘aggregated ties’ in the other study), and CEOs on the board (measured 
separately by ‘outgoing’ and ‘incoming’ ties in the other study). 
RESULTS 
Tables 1a and 1b contain descriptive statistics and correlations for the dyad and ego 
samples, respectively. Because some correlations exceed 0.50, we tested for multicollinearity 
and the VIF scores were below problematic levels. Tables 2 and 3 present the results for tie 
terminations and additions, respectively. Models 1 and 6 include only the controls. In models 2 
and 7 we added the main effects of the variables of interest. Per the baseline expectation, firms 
that accumulated Eastern European experience became more likely to terminate an interlock with 
another firm (p < 0.10) and to form a tie with a new firm (p < 0.01). Model 2 reports that as 
indirect competitor links increased, the odds of termination increased (p < 0.05). Model 7 shows 
a symmetric effect on additions because the negative coefficient means that lower numbers of 
indirect links to competitors encouraged tie formation (p < 0.01). This supports H1a and H1b. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 1a, 1b, 2, and 3 Here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Models 3-5 and 8-10 provide support for H2a and H2b. In Model 3 we report a positive 
and significant interaction of firm experience with indirect competitor links on tie termination (p 
< 0.01). Because the sign and significance of interaction coefficients in non-linear models might 
be inaccurate (Ai & Norton, 2003), we split the sample at the mean level of indirect competitor 
links and compared effects across subsamples (Shaver, 2007) in Models 4-5. The contrast is 
strongly indicative of a positive moderating effect because experience had a negative effect on 
                                                
6 We did not control for firm size because in Germany size is highly correlated with degree centrality. The law 
dictates that the number of directors should be a function of the number of employees—and larger boards 
mathematically have greater numbers of ties. However, in robustness checks, we included firm size in our 
analysis—on its own and with degree centrality—and the results remained unchanged. 
29	  
 
 
termination for firms with low indirect competitor links (p < 0.01) and a positive effect for firms 
with high levels of such links (p < 0.01). In terms of tie additions, the interaction coefficient is 
negative in Model 8 of Table 3 (p < 0.01), and the subsample comparison is consistent with such 
a negative interaction in Models 9-10—a positive effect of experience for the low indirect link 
subsample (p < 0.01) and a negative effect for the high indirect link subsample (p < 0.10). We 
graphed the joint effects of experience and indirect competitor links in Figures 2a and 2b based 
on the estimated coefficients in Models 3 and 8, respectively.7  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2a and 2b Here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Table 4 contains the results for network closure. Model 11 includes only the control 
variables. The lagged dependent variable was highly significant, confirming the importance of 
structural inertia as an explanation for the evolution of network structure. The remaining models 
add our variables of interest in stepwise fashion. We found support for H3 because the 
interaction of experience in Eastern Europe with indirect competitor links was positive and 
significant (p < 0.05) in model 13. This effect is graphed in Figure 3. 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 and Figure 3 Here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Robustness Tests and Mechanism Checks 
We have argued that dyadic protections are insufficient safeguards against the spillover 
risks of indirect ties to rivals. While the results so far control for dyadic protections, we probed 
further into whether our proxy for trust, relative history, was effective in diminishing the risks of 
leakage through indirect ties. We interacted relative history with indirect competitor links and 
found no effect on tie termination, though the main effect of indirect competitor links remained 
significant (p < 0.05). For tie additions, the interaction of relative history with indirect 
competitor links did weaken (p < 0.05) but not eliminate the negative main effect of indirect 
links to rivals on tie formation. Moreover, the interaction of relative history with indirect 
                                                
7 We graphed the linear prediction because there is no clear way of calculating average predicted probabilities for 
the entire sample in fixed effects logit models (see Greene, 2008). The numbers in the vertical axis do not have a 
straightforward interpretation, but the graph accurately shows the interaction effect.  
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competitor links had no effect on network closure. In another specification, including the 
interaction of relative history with EE experience did not change the sign or significance of the 
interaction between EE experience and indirect competitor links for tie terminations (H2a), tie 
additions (H2b), or network closure (H3). These findings lend credence to our core idea that the 
risks posed by indirectly tied rivals are difficult to overcome through dyadic safeguards. 
An alternative explanation for the findings regarding tie terminations could be that 
partners seek to disassociate themselves from a focal firm investing in Eastern Europe if this 
strategy is seen as risky and illegitimate. This would particularly be the case for partners with 
other links to the focal firm’s industry because the pressure to ‘drop’ the focal firm may come 
from the focal firm’s rivals and because the focal firm’s partner has a functionally equivalent 
replacement if it drops the focal firm. We thus ran our models with an additional control for the 
experience in Eastern Europe of indirectly linked competitors, reasoning that this alternative 
explanation depends on whether the focal firm’s competitors are also engaging in Eastern 
European investment. The results reported above are strongly robust to this additional control. 
We mentioned that we chose the measure of experience from seven possible candidates. 
The results concerning tie additions and terminations (H1-H2) remain nearly identical regardless 
of which measure we use. The effects on closure (H3) are supported at p < 0.10 or less for all 
cases except when using the non-logged measure of ‘organizational forgetting.’ This indicates a 
reasonably strong robustness given the many different theories of how experience relates to 
knowledge. While most firms in the sample can be clearly categorized into a single GICS code 
(e.g. Allianz clearly belongs in insurance), five firms could be considered highly diversified per 
the Forbes list of worldwide conglomerates and may have competitors in multiple industries. We 
excluded them from the sample and found nearly identical results for all the hypotheses.  
DISCUSSION 
The tension between cooperative knowledge sharing and the unwanted leakage of that 
knowledge is salient in interorganizational ties. Scholarly interest in this dilemma has centered 
on sources of this problem at the locus of the dyad and solutions designed to help direct partners 
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behave constructively. Social networks research—which emphasizes extra-dyadic processes—
has tended to focus on the positive aspects of broader structures (e.g. learning, innovation, 
performance) and, relatively speaking, overlooked the risks of knowledge spillover to indirectly 
linked competitors. The study by Cox-Pahnke et al. (2014), which was developed concurrently 
with ours, shows that indirect ties to rivals undermine innovation—reinforcing the importance of 
adopting protections designed to mitigate their unique threats. These extra-dyadic risks require 
solutions that go beyond those considered by work focused on knowledge leakage to direct 
partners. Our central contribution is to introduce second order links to rivals as a source of 
leakage risk and demonstrate that firms pursue pruning, grafting, and closing as defensive 
mechanisms to protect their strategic knowledge from this novel source of risk—even when 
dyadic safeguards are in place.  
Our work speaks most directly to studies on various defenses to mitigate risks of 
knowledge spillover from network partners. Recent papers on the ‘sharks’ dilemma have made 
important advances by showing that strategic and social considerations are crucial at the time of 
tie formation (e.g. Katila et al. 2008; Diestre & Rajagopalan, 2012). Hallen et al. (2013) and 
Polidoro et al. (2011) discuss how extra-dyadic properties such as centrality and structural 
embeddedness can be effective safeguards by encouraging tie formation or preventing tie 
dissolution, though in these papers the immediate partner is the source of the risk and the target 
of the safeguard. The risk posed by second degree ties would be relatively inconsequential if 
solutions directed at first degree partners were also effective in preventing leakage to indirectly 
linked rivals. We argued why such solutions are unlikely to be sufficient and which additional 
safeguards – i.e., pruning, grafting, and closing the network – the firm may use.  
 Interestingly, the additional tests reported in the robustness section reveal that a powerful 
dyadic safeguard like trust does little to change the tendency of firms to prune, graft, and close 
their networks to protect their knowledge from leaking to competitors. This is intriguing because 
it suggests a boundary condition to the virtues of relational embeddedness (e.g. Dyer & Singh, 
1998). A natural question is why a firm might deem a trusted partner insufficiently reliable to 
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protect its knowledge and sever or avoid the tie or close its network. We argued that the risk of 
indirect leakage might be too complex to deal with only through behavioral solutions. It might 
also be that trust itself is strained when a current partner increasingly begins forming ties with 
rivals. The data did not allow us to explore this further, but we see this as an interesting issue to 
be studied more carefully. We emphasize that we do not see trust or other dyadic safeguards as 
unimportant. Rather, we think it is useful for research to better understand the conditions under 
which specific safeguards are effective or ineffective.  
While the risks of indirect links to rivals exist in other networks, in board settings firms 
are either legally constrained or highly unlikely to establish direct ties to rivals. In alliances, in 
contrast, firms establish both direct and indirect ties to rivals (e.g. Hamel, 1991). An interesting 
study would assess the different risks of direct and indirect links to rivals as well as the defenses 
that are effective for each kind of risk. Of course, we only looked at second-degree paths to 
rivals, and further work should consider how different path lengths and affect protective actions 
in knowledge networks. Indirect links may also have strategic benefits as sources of intelligence 
regarding rivals. Our focus was on the conditions that create more costs than benefits, triggered 
by the accumulation of high levels of strategic knowledge. It may be interesting to more 
explicitly model inflows and outflows of competitive knowledge to understand when preserving 
vs. dropping such linkages is warranted.  
As mentioned earlier, networks research has for long emphasized the relevance of extra-
dyadic relationships with constructs like triads, centrality, structural holes, closure, or structural 
embeddedness. This work has produced tremendous insights on the positive consequences of 
social structure, but it has tended to overlook the identity of the nodes indirectly linked 
throughout the broader structure. The implicit assumption has been that, given two nodes with 
identical positions, resources will flow to them in the same way despite nodal attributes. Burt’s 
(2010) work on secondhand brokerage and closure seeks to question some of these benefits, but 
even in those studies the emphasis is on the lack of upsides instead of explicit downsides. We 
have specifically identified second-order nodes as rivals or non-rivals and demonstrated how 
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firms seek to prevent knowledge flows to rivals, so that nodal attributes interact with structure 
(e.g. Cowan & Jonard, 2009). Rivalry is important as an attribute because it brings up 
competition in networks and encourages researchers to consider how certain structures can have 
negative outcomes if they enable undesirable resource flows.  
Relatedly, our focus on knowledge derived from experience is also relevant for research 
on organizational learning. The literature on experiential learning has emphasized the value of 
experience in a knowledge domain for application to future related decisions (Argote, 1999). Yet 
we argue that knowledge also has value as a network resource prized by others and show that its 
accumulation creates risks of leakage to rivals through the network. This is consequential 
because it means that the different rates at which firms develop experience with valuable 
strategies may help explain changes in their network composition and structure. At the same 
time, one firm’s experiential learning is the source of vicarious learning for another firm. Our 
findings imply that competitive considerations may undermine the process of vicarious learning 
when indirect links to rivals are involved—particularly for firms that generate such indirect ties. 
Moreover, firms that possess the knowledge may seek to block rivals from the opportunity to 
learn vicariously. Thus, competition is an important consideration in determining how quickly 
and from whom firms learn in networks (e.g. Ingram & Baum, 1997).  
The safeguards of pruning, grafting, and closing imply a degree of influence over 
network composition and structure—and thus are highly relevant for the network dynamics 
literature. Pruning and grafting are about terminating and avoiding risky ties, and tie additions 
and terminations are the building blocks of network change. We are able to explain which ties 
get added and dropped not because of joint value creation or the lack thereof, but rather because 
of the downside risk of knowledge spillover to a rival. In terms of structural change, we provide 
an important explanation for the evolution of network structure towards closure. Burt (2002) 
points out the velocity with which bridging positions in networks seem to disappear and other 
scholars have wondered why, if structural holes provide so many advantages, they are not 
‘closed’ more rapidly by alters seeking to undermine the firm’s brokerage advantage (e.g. 
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Salancik, 1995). Such explanations of closure focus on the motivations of partners who seek to 
undermine the advantage of the ego. Our results provide a different explanation: the broker itself 
has a defensive, competitive motivation to close its network. This may cause a loss of brokerage 
advantages (Ryall & Sorenson, 2007) but is compensated by the increased safety of strategic 
knowledge, though firms probably have less control over closure than over pruning and grafting.  
At a broader level, this study helps provide a more balanced picture of the upsides and 
downsides of networks. Accounts of network evolution, for example, tend to focus on 
cooperative or ‘positive’ motivations to explain network composition and structure. While calls 
have been made to better understand how competition and other risks in networks affect network 
change (Ahuja, Soda, & Zaheer, 2012; Gulati, 2007), empirical work in this area is still sparse 
and focuses on the negative content of the tie itself (e.g. Sytch & Tartarynowicz, 2013) rather 
than on the presence and location of the firms rivals in the network. We believe our paper adds 
value in this regard and resonates with Lin’s notion that resource protection is a fundamental 
imperative in networks and that “only when the existing valued resources are secured do 
[network] actors seek to gain additional valued resources.” (2001: 32-33)  
Limitations and Future Research Possibilities 
 We do not directly observe firms’ motives for dissolving and establishing board ties or 
for closing their networks, nor do we measure the strength and variety of knowledge that firms 
exchange through ties. While the interviews we conducted validated some of the mechanisms we 
propose, ultimately we cannot causally prove that the protection of knowledge drives the results. 
Our focus was on board interlocks regardless of how they are formed, but it would be interesting 
to assess whether interlocks originating from the management board differ in terms of leakage 
risk and influence on pruning and closing from those generated by the supervisory board. We 
were unable to include certain relevant variables in the empirical analysis. For instance, 
heterogeneity in the mode and size of investment into Eastern Europe may affect the perceived 
threat of knowledge spillover but we cannot explore that possibility. We also lacked data on 
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exogenous shocks that create vacancy chains and impact changes in the board network (Lusher, 
Koskinen, & Robins, 2012), such as the untimely death or retirement of a director. 
 We have projected a two-mode board interlock network (composed of individuals and 
firms) onto a single-mode network of interfirm ties. Recent studies have begun pointing out 
biases in measures of closure when projecting from the ‘event’ (i.e. firm) to the ‘individual’ (i.e. 
director) network (Opsahl, 2013; Piepenbrink & Gaur, 2013). There is little guidance on the 
prevalence of this problem when projecting from the individual to the firm network, as we do, so 
our measures should be considered with some caution until further research on this issue comes 
to light. Also, while the dynamic panel estimator addresses multiple sources of endogeneity 
simultaneously, it is not equipped to include theoretically derived instruments for endogenous 
regressors. Relatedly, the necessary use of robust standard errors in the models of network 
closure prevented us from conducting the Sargan test of overidentification (Arellano & Bond, 
1991). Yet the dynamic panel estimator provides a reasonable set of benefits despite these 
tradeoffs. Finally, the choice to focus on within-dyad variance in the analyses of terminations 
and additions requires caution in interpreting the coefficients as applying to effects over time for 
dyads that experience a change. Results might differ in an analysis including dyads that never 
form or dissolve, though unobserved heterogeneity would be a concern in such models.  
 Conclusion. We explored how firms protect themselves against the risks of an unwanted 
leakage of strategic knowledge to indirectly linked competitors. We argued that safeguards 
directed at preventing opportunistic behavior by directly linked firms in a dyad are not sufficient 
to overcome extra-dyadic risks of knowledge spillover. Instead, firms attempt to manage the 
composition and structure of their network through pruning, grafting, and closing. These 
safeguards become increasingly important as firms accumulate strategic knowledge and as their 
partners generate more indirect ties to competitors. We found support for our theorizing in a 
longitudinal study of changes in the network of German board interlocks during 1990-2003. 
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Figure 1 
Different Ways of Creating Indirect Competitor Links via Board Interlocks 
 
 
 
  
 
Board 
Management 
 
Board 
Management 
 
Board 
Management 
Firm	  B	  (rival	  of	  A) Firm	  A	  (rival	  of	  B) Firm	  Z 
41	  
 
 
Figure 2 
Illustration of Indirect Links to Competitors 
	  
NOTES:	  	  
• Firms	  highlighted	  in	  GRAY	  are	  in	  the	  same	  industry	  as	  the	  focal	  firm	  (IWKA)	  
• This	  is	  an	  example	  from	  a	  firm	  with	  a	  relatively	  small	  network	  (only	  four	  partners)	  used	  for	  illustrative	  
purposes.	  It	  was	  used	  here	  because	  its	  small	  size	  makes	  its	  depiction	  straightforward.	  While	  each	  of	  IWKA’s	  
partners	  generates	  at	  least	  one	  indirect	  link	  to	  competitors,	  most	  firms	  in	  the	  sample	  have	  much	  larger	  
networks	  (e.g.	  mean	  degree	  centrality	  in	  the	  sample	  is	  close	  to	  19)	  in	  which	  several	  partners	  create	  no	  indirect	  
links	  to	  competitors.	  	  
• Links	  between	  IWKA’s	  direct	  partners	  are	  not	  included	  for	  simplification.	  Most	  ego	  networks	  in	  the	  sample	  
have	  at	  least	  some	  ties	  among	  alters.	  
• Please	  refer	  to	  the	  text	  for	  a	  description	  of	  how	  indirect	  ties	  to	  competitors	  are	  calculated	  at	  the	  ego	  network	  
level.	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Figure 3a 
Eastern European Experience * Indirect Competitor Links: Effect on Tie Termination  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3b 
Eastern European Experience * Indirect Competitor Links: Effect on Tie Addition 
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Figure 3c 
Eastern European Experience * Indirect Competitor Links: Effect on Closure 
 
 
 
Mean +1 SD-1 SD
.2
.2
5
.3
.3
5
.4
Eg
o 
N
et
w
or
k 
C
lo
su
re
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Eastern European Experience (log)
Low Ind. Comp. Links High Ind. Comp. Links
44	  
 
 
Table 1a 
Descriptive	  Statistics	  and	  Correlations	  (Dyadic	  Samples)	  
F	  =	  Focal	  Firm	  
P	  =	  Partner	  
	  
Note:	  The	  numbers	  below	  are	  based	  on	  the	  combined	  samples	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  tie	  additions	  and	  deletions	  to	  avoid	  creating	  two	  nearly	  identical	  tables.	  
Summary	  statistics	  and	  correlations	  are	  highly	  similar	  but	  may	  vary	  slightly	  across	  subsamples.	  
	  
Variable	   Mean	   SD	   Min	   Max	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	   13	   14	   15	   16	   17	   18	   19	   20	   21	   22	   23	   24	   25	   26	   27	  
1	  Terminated	   0.19	   0.39	   0	   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2	  Added	   0.13	   0.34	   0	   1	   N/A	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3	  F	  Ind.	  Comp.	  Links	   0.53	   0.84	   0	   6	   .01	   .00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4	  F	  EE	  experience	   1.08	   0.76	   0	   2.64	   .12	   .09	   -­‐.09	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  5	  Relative	  history	   0.95	   3.82	   -­‐13	   13	   .12	   -­‐.05	   -­‐.50	   .19	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  6	  P	  Ind.	  Comp.	  Links	   0.53	   0.84	   0	   6	   .01	   .00	   -­‐.04	   .05	   .01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  7	  EE	  experience	  diff.	   0.01	   3.06	   -­‐12	   12	   .00	   .00	   -­‐.15	   .50	   .10	   .15	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  8	  F	  Degree	  centrality	   18.98	   10.58	   0	   43.05	   -­‐.05	   .04	   -­‐.09	   .21	   .13	   .32	   .24	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  9	  F	  Profitability	   0.03	   0.05	   -­‐0.31	   0.41	   .04	   -­‐.01	   -­‐.05	   .05	   .03	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.19	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  10	  F	  Foreign	  sales	   0.49	   0.23	   0	   0.89	   .06	   .02	   .22	   .32	   -­‐.08	   .01	   .12	   .08	   .08	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  11	  F	  Closure	   0.19	   0.18	   0	   1	   .02	   -­‐.04	   .04	   -­‐.13	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.19	   -­‐.12	   -­‐.55	   .20	   -­‐.06	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  12	  F	  Stock	  option	  exp.	   0.18	   0.38	   0	   1	   .12	   .00	   -­‐.08	   .42	   .14	   .01	   .13	   .10	   .06	   .23	   -­‐.05	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  13	  F	  CEOs	  on	  board	   1.18	   1.19	   0	   6	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.01	   .01	   .04	   .00	   .21	   .13	   .56	   -­‐.17	   .03	   -­‐.31	   .03	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  14	  F	  Equity	  owned	  by	  others	   0.09	   0.16	   0	   0.80	   .00	   .01	   .00	   .06	   .01	   .04	   .00	   .18	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.14	   -­‐.13	   .02	   .23	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  15	  F	  Equity	  owned	  in	  others	   0.06	   0.15	   0	   0.99	   -­‐.01	   -­‐.03	   .02	   .13	   -­‐.02	   .10	   .15	   .30	   -­‐.14	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.13	   .06	   .19	   .07	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  16	  F	  Director	  busyness	   0.77	   0.44	   0	   4.50	   -­‐.08	   .04	   .02	   .04	   -­‐.01	   .19	   .06	   .59	   -­‐.06	   .13	   -­‐.36	   -­‐.15	   .45	   .24	   .17	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  17	  F	  Acquisition	  exp.	   1.59	   1.06	   0	   4.36	   .06	   .07	   -­‐.14	   .55	   .19	   .18	   .34	   .51	   -­‐.08	   .19	   -­‐.28	   .30	   .23	   .01	   .21	   .17	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  18	  P	  Degree	  centrality	   18.85	   10.62	   0	   43.05	   -­‐.05	   .04	   .33	   -­‐.03	   -­‐.09	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.24	   .02	   .00	   .00	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.08	   .01	   .01	   -­‐.02	   .06	   -­‐.05	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  19	  P	  Profitability	   0.03	   0.05	   -­‐0.31	   0.41	   .04	   -­‐.01	   -­‐.07	   .08	   .03	   -­‐.06	   .02	   .00	   .01	   .01	   .03	   .06	   -­‐.01	   .00	   .01	   -­‐.03	   .06	   -­‐.18	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  20	  P	  Foreign	  sales	   0.49	   0.23	   0	   0.89	   .06	   .01	   .02	   .16	   .02	   .22	   -­‐.12	   -­‐.01	   .01	   .09	   -­‐.03	   .13	   .02	   .00	   .01	   -­‐.02	   .09	   .08	   .08	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  21	  P	  Closure	   0.19	   0.18	   0	   1	   .02	   -­‐.04	   -­‐.19	   -­‐.01	   .06	   .03	   .12	   -­‐.07	   .02	   -­‐.03	   .08	   .06	   -­‐.06	   .00	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.09	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.55	   .20	   -­‐.07	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  22	  P	  EE	  experience	   1.08	   0.76	   0	   2.64	   .12	   .09	   .05	   .38	   .11	   -­‐.09	   -­‐.50	   -­‐.03	   .08	   .17	   .00	   .30	   -­‐.07	   .03	   -­‐.04	   -­‐.07	   .22	   .22	   .05	   .32	   -­‐.13	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  23	  P	  Stock	  option	  exp.	   0.17	   0.38	   0	   1	   .13	   .00	   .02	   .30	   .05	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.14	   -­‐.09	   .06	   .14	   .06	   .40	   -­‐.05	   .01	   .00	   -­‐.14	   .14	   .10	   .06	   .23	   -­‐.05	   .42	  
	   	   	   	   	  24	  P	  CEOs	  on	  board	   1.18	   1.19	   0	   6	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.01	   .21	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.10	   .02	   -­‐.14	   .01	   -­‐.01	   .02	   -­‐.05	   -­‐.05	   .02	   .02	   -­‐.01	   .07	   -­‐.05	   .56	   -­‐.17	   .03	   -­‐.31	   .04	   .03	  
	   	   	   	  25	  P	  Equity	  owned	  by	  others	   0.09	   0.16	   0	   0.80	   .00	   .01	   .05	   .03	   .02	   .01	   -­‐.01	   .01	   .00	   -­‐.01	   .00	   .01	   .02	   .02	   .02	   .01	   .02	   .19	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.14	   -­‐.13	   .06	   .01	   .24	  
	   	   	  26	  P	  Equity	  owned	  in	  others	   0.06	   0.15	   0	   0.99	   -­‐.01	   -­‐.03	   .10	   -­‐.04	   -­‐.04	   .02	   -­‐.15	   -­‐.02	   .01	   .01	   -­‐.02	   .00	   -­‐.01	   .02	   -­‐.02	   .02	   -­‐.05	   .30	   -­‐.15	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.13	   .13	   .07	   .19	   .08	  
	   	  27	  P	  Director	  busyness	   0.77	   0.44	   0	   4.50	   -­‐.08	   .04	   .20	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.07	   .03	   -­‐.06	   .06	   -­‐.03	   -­‐.01	   -­‐.09	   -­‐.13	   .07	   .02	   .01	   .11	   -­‐.03	   .59	   -­‐.06	   .13	   -­‐.36	   .04	   -­‐.15	   .45	   .24	   .17	  
	  28	  P	  Acquisition	  exp.	   1.59	   1.06	   0	   4.36	   .06	   .07	   .18	   .22	   .00	   -­‐.14	   -­‐.34	   -­‐.05	   .06	   .10	   .00	   .14	   -­‐.05	   .03	   -­‐.05	   -­‐.03	   .09	   .51	   -­‐.09	   .19	   -­‐.28	   .56	   .30	   .23	   .01	   .21	   .17	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Table 1b 
Descriptive	  Statistics	  and	  Correlations	  (Ego	  Network	  Sample)	  
F	  =	  Focal	  Firm	  
P	  =	  Partner	  
 
Variable	   Mean	   SD	   Min	   Max	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	   11	   12	   13	   14	   15	   16	   17	   18	   19	   20	   21	   22	   23	  
1	  Closure	   0.32	   0.29	   0.09	   1	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  2	  F	  EE	  experience	   1.08	   0.77	   0	   2.64	   -­‐.21
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3	  F	  Ind.	  Comp.	  Links	   0.61	   0.73	   0	   3.64	   -­‐.18	   -­‐.03	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  4	  Relative	  History	   1.86	   3.36	   -­‐11	   12.67	   .06	   .21	   -­‐.55	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  5	  F	  Degree	  centrality	   14.53	   10.90	   1.38	   43.05	   -­‐.72	   .22	   .03	   .00	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  6	  P	  Degree	  centrality	   19.93	   6.12	   1.38	   31.94	   -­‐.68	   .16	   .11	   -­‐.09	   .57	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  7	  EE	  Experience	  diff.	   -­‐0.33	   2.48	   -­‐9	   8.15	   -­‐.08	   .55	   -­‐.11	   .16	   .18	   -­‐.01	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  8	  F	  Profitability	   0.03	   0.05	   -­‐0.31	   0.41	   .21	   .02	   -­‐.09	   .04	   -­‐.21	   -­‐.16	   .02	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  9	  F	  Foreign	  Sales	   0.48	   0.25	   0	   0.89	   -­‐.19	   .35	   .33	   -­‐.13	   .13	   .19	   .15	   .07	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  10	  F	  Stock	  Option	  exp.	   0.19	   0.39	   0	   1	   -­‐.15	   .45	   -­‐.04	   .11	   .16	   .04	   .12	   .03	   .27	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  11	  F	  CEOs	  on	  board	   0.89	   1.12	   0	   6	   -­‐.40	   .11	   .05	   -­‐.05	   .62	   .38	   .13	   -­‐.17	   .07	   .12	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  12	  F	  Equity	  owned	  by	  others	   0.07	   0.15	   0	   0.80	   -­‐.26	   .07	   .03	   -­‐.07	   .25	   .15	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.12	   -­‐.11	   .00	   .23	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  13	  F	  Equity	  owned	  in	  others	   0.04	   0.13	   0	   0.99	   -­‐.19	   .13	   .03	   -­‐.05	   .33	   .14	   .13	   -­‐.12	   -­‐.04	   .13	   .21	   .09	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  14	  F	  Director	  busyness	   0.65	   0.47	   0	   4.50	   -­‐.45	   .06	   .12	   -­‐.10	   .54	   .47	   -­‐.05	   -­‐.03	   .14	   -­‐.07	   .38	   .24	   .16	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  15	  P	  Profitability	   0.03	   0.03	   -­‐0.31	   0.22	   .11	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.05	   .04	   -­‐.06	   -­‐.21	   -­‐.05	   .09	   -­‐.05	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.06	   .00	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.04	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  16	  P	  Foreign	  Sales	   0.48	   0.14	   0	   0.89	   -­‐.30	   .40	   .06	   .00	   .17	   .28	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.04	   .24	   .36	   .13	   .00	   .11	   .09	   .02	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  17	  P	  EE	  experience	   3.54	   2.48	   0	   14	   -­‐.13	   .48	   .04	   .14	   .10	   .20	   -­‐.35	   -­‐.02	   .22	   .45	   .05	   .06	   .03	   .08	   -­‐.06	   .47	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  18	  P	  CEOs	  on	  board	   1.19	   0.64	   0	   4.50	   -­‐.43	   .05	   .04	   -­‐.09	   .43	   .68	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.16	   .15	   .02	   .39	   .11	   .12	   .40	   -­‐.22	   .18	   .17	  
	   	   	   	   	  19	  P	  Equity	  owned	  by	  others	   0.10	   0.07	   0	   0.51	   -­‐.13	   .11	   -­‐.09	   .03	   .12	   .27	   .03	   .05	   .01	   .03	   .12	   .10	   .05	   .10	   -­‐.17	   -­‐.02	   .12	   .22	  
	   	   	   	  20	  P	  Equity	  owned	  in	  others	   0.06	   0.06	   0	   0.50	   -­‐.22	   .03	   .04	   -­‐.03	   .20	   .37	   -­‐.09	   -­‐.06	   .11	   .24	   .15	   .13	   .00	   .11	   -­‐.20	   .09	   .24	   .25	   .13	  
	   	   	   	  21	  P	  Director	  busyness	   0.74	   0.25	   0	   1.35	   -­‐.52	   -­‐.06	   .05	   -­‐.08	   .45	   .69	   .12	   -­‐.13	   .05	   -­‐.26	   .31	   .10	   .10	   .34	   -­‐.10	   .08	   -­‐.23	   .43	   .23	   .17	  
	   	   	  22	  F	  Acquisition	  exp.	   1.43	   1.07	   0	   4.36	   -­‐.36	   .59	   -­‐.12	   .22	   .51	   .30	   .32	   -­‐.10	   .21	   .36	   .28	   .04	   .23	   .19	   -­‐.08	   .27	   .39	   .19	   .15	   .09	   .12	  
	   	  23	  P	  Acquisition	  exp.	   5.88	   0.55	   4.48	   6.46	   .00	   .61	   -­‐.02	   .21	   -­‐.07	   -­‐.04	   -­‐.13	   .08	   .19	   .41	   -­‐.08	   .03	   -­‐.03	   -­‐.07	   .02	   .39	   .77	   -­‐.07	   .10	   -­‐.01	   -­‐.29	   .36	  
	  24	  Same	  industry	  partners	   5.91	   16.20	   0	   100	   .15	   -­‐.04	   .23	   -­‐.25	   -­‐.16	   -­‐.10	   .01	   .01	   .11	   .00	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.03	   -­‐.03	   -­‐.08	   -­‐.03	   .05	   -­‐.08	   .01	   .03	   .00	   -­‐.02	   -­‐.17 -­‐.01	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Table 2 
Probability	  of	  Tie	  Termination	  (Dyadic	  Level)	  
Fixed	  Effects	  Logit,	  robust	  standard	  errors	  (*	  p	  <	  0.10,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05,	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01,	  one	  tailed	  for	  hypotheses)	  
	  	   1	   2	   3	   4	   5	  
	  	   Controls	   Main	  Effects	   Interaction	   Low	  ICL	   High	  ICL	  
Indirect	  Competitor	  Links	  (ICL)	  
	  	  
0.557	  **	   -­‐0.677	  **	  
	  
-­‐1.346	  ***	  
	  	  	  (partner	  creates	  for	  firm)	  
	  	  
(0.237)	  
	  
(0.301)	  
	   	  
(0.364)	  	  
EE	  experience	  
	  	  
0.613	  *	   -­‐0.053	  
	  
-­‐2.321	  ***	   2.046	  ***	  
	  	  
	  	  
(0.403)	  
	  
(0.437)	  
	  
(0.855)	  
	  
(0.606)	  	  
EE	  Experience	  X	  ICL	  
	  	   	  
1.276	  ***	  
	   	  
	  	  
	  	  
	  	   	  
(0.321)	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Relative	  history	   0.745	  ***	   0.742	  ***	   0.858	  ***	   3.137	  ***	   1.431	  ***	  
	  	   (0.080)	  
	  
(0.077)	  
	  
(0.088)	  
	  
(0.286)	  
	  
(0.304)	  	  
Indirect	  Competitor	  Links	   0.045	  
	  
-­‐0.001	  
	  
0.027	  
	  
0.344	  
	  
-­‐0.216	  	  
	  	  	  (firm	  creates	  for	  partner)	   (0.162)	  
	  
(0.165)	  
	  
(0.163)	  
	  
(0.363)	  
	  
(0.304)	  	  
EE	  experience	  difference	   0.032	  
	  
-­‐0.088	  
	  
-­‐0.077	  
	  
0.192	  
	  
-­‐0.089	  	  
	  	   (0.065)	  
	  
(0.108)	  
	  
(0.110)	  
	  
(0.237)	  
	  
(0.153)	  	  
Firm	  degree	  centrality	   -­‐0.004	  
	  
-­‐0.001	  
	  
0.001	  
	  
0.063	  
	  
-­‐0.005	  	  
	  	   (0.024)	  
	  
(0.024)	  
	  
(0.025)	  
	  
(0.041)	  
	  
(0.050)	  	  
Firm	  profitability	   2.996	  **	   2.990	  **	   2.983	  **	   2.043	  
	  
5.842	  **	  
	  	   (1.390)	  
	  
(1.346)	  
	  
(1.212)	  
	  
(2.967)	  
	  
(2.448)	  	  
Firm	  foreign	  sales	   2.292	  *	   2.412	  **	   2.265	  *	   -­‐3.638	  
	  
6.285	  ***	  
	  	   (1.176)	  
	  
(1.198)	  
	  
(1.198)	  
	  
(2.233)	  
	  
(2.205)	  	  
Firm	  constraint	   0.925	  
	  
0.881	  
	  
1.066	  
	  
0.951	  
	  
-­‐1.203	  	  
	  	   (0.688)	  
	  
(0.700)	  
	  
(0.704)	  
	  
(0.879)	  
	  
(1.564)	  	  
Firm	  stock	  option	  experience	   -­‐0.365	  
	  
-­‐0.367	  
	  
-­‐0.339	  
	  
-­‐1.680	  ***	   -­‐0.361	  	  
	  	   (0.231)	  
	  
(0.232)	  
	  
(0.233)	  
	  
(0.439)	  
	  
(0.417)	  	  
Firm	  CEOs	  on	  board	   -­‐0.180	  *	   -­‐0.146	  
	  
-­‐0.139	  
	  
-­‐0.610	  **	   0.149	  	  
	  	   (0.107)	  
	  
(0.108)	  
	  
(0.109)	  
	  
(0.275)	  
	  
(0.173)	  	  
Firm	  equity	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	   1.011	  
	  
0.882	  
	  
0.776	  
	  
1.499	  
	  
1.470	  	  
	  	   (0.831)	  
	  
(0.846)	  
	  
(0.892)	  
	  
(1.661)	  
	  
(1.077)	  	  
Firm	  equity	  owned	  in	  other	  firms	   0.106	  
	  
0.164	  
	  
0.465	  
	  
1.173	  
	  
0.803	  	  
	  	   (0.637)	  
	  
(0.629)	  
	  
(0.601)	  
	  
(1.126)	  
	  
(0.869)	  	  
Firm	  director	  busyness	   0.507	  **	   0.534	  **	   0.571	  **	   1.135	  ***	   0.719	  	  
	  	   (0.221)	  
	  
(0.223)	  
	  
(0.224)	  
	  
(0.335)	  
	  
(0.641)	  	  
Firm	  acquisition	  experience	   0.642	  ***	   0.617	  ***	   0.642	  ***	   -­‐0.068	  
	  
0.966	  ***	  
	  	   (0.185)	  
	  
(0.188)	  
	  
(0.187)	  
	  
(0.342)	  
	  
(0.371)	  	  
Partner	  degree	  centrality	   0.038	  
	  
0.029	  
	  
0.029	  
	  
0.098	  **	   0.025	  	  
	  	   (0.023)	  
	  
(0.023)	  
	  
(0.022)	  
	  
(0.050)	  
	  
(0.039)	  	  
Partner	  profitability	   2.119	  *	   1.967	  
	  
1.998	  
	  
-­‐2.520	  
	  
1.994	  	  
	  	   (1.250)	  
	  
(1.226)	  
	  
(1.236)	  
	  
(2.346)	  
	  
(2.716)	  	  
Partner	  foreign	  sales	   1.833	  *	   1.635	  
	  
1.304	  
	  
-­‐4.381	  **	   1.414	  	  
	  	   (1.027)	  
	  
(1.029)	  
	  
(1.027)	  
	  
(1.855)	  
	  
(2.033)	  	  
Partner	  constraint	   0.548	  
	  
0.488	  
	  
0.462	  
	  
-­‐1.207	  
	  
5.309	  	  
	  	   (0.688)	  
	  
(0.660)	  
	  
(0.675)	  
	  
(0.946)	  
	  
(3.857)	  	  
Partner	  EE	  experience	   0.541	  *	   0.107	  
	  
-­‐0.035	  
	  
-­‐1.706	  **	   0.904	  	  
	  	   (0.298)	  
	  
(0.397)	  
	  
(0.412)	  
	  
(0.682)	  
	  
(0.615)	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Partner	  stock	  option	  experience	   -­‐0.045	  
	  
-­‐0.125	  
	  
-­‐0.171	  
	  
-­‐1.586	  ***	   0.771	  **	  
	  	   (0.232)	  
	  
(0.227)	  
	  
(0.228)	  
	  
(0.413)	  
	  
(0.377)	  	  
Partner	  CEOs	  on	  board	   -­‐0.103	  
	  
-­‐0.114	  
	  
-­‐0.132	  
	  
-­‐0.036	  
	  
-­‐0.380	  **	  
	  	   (0.102)	  
	  
(0.106)	  
	  
(0.105)	  
	  
(0.255)	  
	  
(0.155)	  	  
Partner	  equity	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	   0.627	  
	  
0.706	  
	  
0.680	  
	  
0.234	  
	  
-­‐1.484	  	  
	  	   (0.800)	  
	  
(0.799)	  
	  
(0.784)	  
	  
(1.159)	  
	  
(1.385)	  	  
Partner	  equity	  owned	  in	  other	  firms	   0.669	  
	  
0.731	  
	  
0.851	  
	  
-­‐0.024	  
	  
0.799	  	  
	  	   (0.628)	  
	  
(0.662)	  
	  
(0.655)	  
	  
(1.198)	  
	  
(0.970)	  	  
Partner	  director	  busyness	   -­‐0.023	  
	  
-­‐0.028	  
	  
0.013	  
	  
-­‐0.007	  
	  
0.249	  	  
	  	   (0.192)	  
	  
(0.191)	  
	  
(0.185)	  
	  
(0.263)	  
	  
(0.434)	  	  
Partner	  acquisition	  experience	   0.713	  ***	   0.682	  ***	   0.650	  ***	   0.234	  
	  
0.775	  **	  
	  	   (0.187)	  
	  
(0.191)	  
	  
(0.194)	  
	  
(0.400)	  
	  
(0.334)	  	  
Dyad,	  Firm,	  Partner,	  Industry	  FE	   Y	  	  	   Y	  	   Y	  	   Y	  	   Y	  	  
Sample	  size	  (firm-­‐partner	  years)	   4583	  
	  
4583	  
	  
4583	  
	  
2760	  
	  
1390	  	  
Model	  Chi2	   168.169	  ***	   198.981	  ***	   191.632	  ***	   249.483	  ***	   83.984	  ***	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0.3641	  	  	   0.3693	  	   0.3860	  	   0.7355	  	   0.3976	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Table 3 
Probability	  of	  Tie	  Formation	  (Dyadic	  Level)	  
Fixed	  Effects	  Logit,	  robust	  standard	  errors	  (*	  p	  <	  0.10,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05,	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01,	  one	  tailed	  for	  hypotheses)	  
	  	   6	   7	   8	   9	   10	  
	  	   Controls	   Main	  Effects	   Interaction	   Low	  ICL	   High	  ICL	  
Indirect	  Competitor	  Links	  (ICL)	  
	  	  
-­‐0.613	  ***	   0.396	  
	   	  
0.983	  ***	  
	  	  	  (partner	  creates	  for	  firm)	  
	  	  
(0.229)	  
	  
(0.256)	  
	   	  
(0.257)	  	  
EE	  experience	  
	  	  
0.377	  **	   0.845	  ***	   2.267	  ***	   -­‐0.574	  *	  
	  	  
	  	  
(0.200)	  
	  
(0.219)	  
	  
(0.582)	  
	  
(0.410)	  	  
EE	  Experience	  X	  ICL	  
	  	   	  
-­‐1.100	  ***	  
	   	  
	  	  
	  	  
	  	   	  
(0.190)	  
	   	   	  
	  	  
Relative	  history	   -­‐0.383	  ***	   -­‐0.401	  ***	   -­‐0.520	  ***	   -­‐5.597	  ***	   -­‐0.808	  ***	  
	  	   (0.043)	  
	  
(0.043)	  
	  
(0.053)	  
	  
(1.547)	  
	  
(0.111)	  	  
Indirect	  Competitor	  Links	   -­‐0.046	  
	  
-­‐0.034	  
	  
-­‐0.031	  
	  
-­‐0.179	  
	  
-­‐0.044	  	  
	  	  	  (firm	  creates	  for	  partner)	   (0.148)	  
	  
(0.148)	  
	  
(0.149)	  
	  
(0.311)	  
	  
(0.283)	  	  
EE	  experience	  difference	   0.162	  ***	   0.087	  *	   0.055	  
	  
0.135	  
	  
0.031	  	  
	  	   (0.032)	  
	  
(0.050)	  
	  
(0.051)	  
	  
(0.166)	  
	  
(0.111)	  	  
Firm	  degree	  centrality	   0.019	  
	  
0.018	  
	  
0.011	  
	  
0.051	  
	  
0.045	  	  
	  	   (0.017)	  
	  
(0.018)	  
	  
(0.018)	  
	  
(0.042)	  
	  
(0.028)	  	  
Firm	  profitability	   -­‐1.310	  
	  
-­‐1.400	  
	  
-­‐0.848	  
	  
-­‐0.501	  
	  
-­‐1.935	  	  
	  	   (1.161)	  
	  
(1.151)	  
	  
(1.193)	  
	  
(2.247)	  
	  
(2.030)	  	  
Firm	  foreign	  sales	   -­‐1.062	  
	  
-­‐1.093	  
	  
-­‐0.924	  
	  
1.428	  
	  
-­‐3.945	  **	  
	  	   (0.674)	  
	  
(0.666)	  
	  
(0.675)	  
	  
(1.576)	  
	  
(1.533)	  	  
Firm	  constraint	   -­‐0.597	  
	  
-­‐0.634	  *	   -­‐0.734	  *	   -­‐0.933	  
	  
-­‐1.907	  ***	  
	  	   (0.379)	  
	  
(0.372)	  
	  
(0.378)	  
	  
(0.693)	  
	  
(0.733)	  	  
Firm	  stock	  option	  experience	   -­‐0.219	  
	  
-­‐0.195	  
	  
-­‐0.190	  
	  
0.510	  
	  
-­‐0.091	  	  
	  	   (0.203)	  
	  
(0.200)	  
	  
(0.202)	  
	  
(0.316)	  
	  
(0.431)	  	  
Firm	  CEOs	  on	  board	   -­‐0.148	  *	   -­‐0.140	  *	   -­‐0.153	  *	   -­‐0.189	  *	   -­‐0.200	  	  
	  	   (0.081)	  
	  
(0.082)	  
	  
(0.083)	  
	  
(0.112)	  
	  
(0.178)	  	  
Firm	  equity	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	   -­‐0.305	  
	  
-­‐0.457	  
	  
-­‐0.518	  
	  
0.443	  
	  
-­‐0.086	  	  
	  	   (0.530)	  
	  
(0.528)	  
	  
(0.547)	  
	  
(0.953)	  
	  
(0.695)	  	  
Firm	  equity	  owned	  in	  other	  firms	   -­‐1.258	  **	   -­‐1.185	  **	   -­‐1.207	  **	   -­‐0.462	  
	  
-­‐2.745	  ***	  
	  	   (0.558)	  
	  
(0.529)	  
	  
(0.516)	  
	  
(0.987)	  
	  
(0.997)	  	  
Firm	  director	  busyness	   0.384	  *	   0.349	  *	   0.380	  *	   0.025	  
	  
0.322	  	  
	  	   (0.203)	  
	  
(0.203)	  
	  
(0.199)	  
	  
(0.445)	  
	  
(0.520)	  	  
Firm	  acquisition	  experience	   0.304	  ***	   0.291	  ***	   0.280	  **	   0.849	  ***	   0.018	  	  
	  	   (0.111)	  
	  
(0.113)	  
	  
(0.114)	  
	  
(0.226)	  
	  
(0.245)	  	  
Partner	  degree	  centrality	   0.008	  
	  
0.019	  
	  
0.019	  
	  
0.058	  
	  
-­‐0.025	  	  
	  	   (0.017)	  
	  
(0.018)	  
	  
(0.018)	  
	  
(0.047)	  
	  
(0.032)	  	  
Partner	  profitability	   -­‐0.163	  
	  
-­‐0.133	  
	  
-­‐0.232	  
	  
-­‐0.063	  
	  
-­‐2.818	  	  
	  	   (1.120)	  
	  
(1.110)	  
	  
(1.112)	  
	  
(1.711)	  
	  
(4.010)	  	  
Partner	  foreign	  sales	   -­‐0.591	  
	  
-­‐0.754	  
	  
-­‐0.761	  
	  
2.553	  *	   -­‐0.792	  	  
	  	   (0.655)	  
	  
(0.659)	  
	  
(0.655)	  
	  
(1.479)	  
	  
(1.506)	  	  
Partner	  constraint	   -­‐0.670	  *	   -­‐0.649	  *	   -­‐0.700	  *	   -­‐0.745	  
	  
-­‐8.234	  *	  
	  	   (0.366)	  
	  
(0.365)	  
	  
(0.369)	  
	  
(0.516)	  
	  
(4.288)	  	  
Partner	  EE	  experience	   1.023	  ***	   0.756	  ***	   0.693	  ***	   2.172	  ***	   0.431	  	  
	  	   (0.157)	  
	  
(0.208)	  
	  
(0.209)	  
	  
(0.552)	  
	  
(0.455)	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Partner	  stock	  option	  experience	   -­‐0.477	  **	   -­‐0.504	  **	   -­‐0.425	  **	   1.112	  ***	   -­‐0.985	  **	  
	  	   (0.211)	  
	  
(0.216)	  
	  
(0.217)	  
	  
(0.366)	  
	  
(0.406)	  	  
Partner	  CEOs	  on	  board	   -­‐0.157	  *	   -­‐0.176	  **	   -­‐0.190	  **	   -­‐0.173	  
	  
-­‐0.181	  	  
	  	   (0.084)	  
	  
(0.086)	  
	  
(0.088)	  
	  
(0.138)	  
	  
(0.154)	  	  
Partner	  equity	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	   -­‐0.131	  
	  
-­‐0.194	  
	  
-­‐0.116	  
	  
0.426	  
	  
-­‐0.985	  	  
	  	   (0.539)	  
	  
(0.537)	  
	  
(0.565)	  
	  
(0.798)	  
	  
(0.982)	  	  
Partner	  equity	  owned	  in	  other	  firms	   -­‐1.247	  ***	   -­‐1.265	  ***	   -­‐1.376	  ***	   -­‐0.692	  
	  
-­‐1.646	  *	  
	  	   (0.451)	  
	  
(0.456)	  
	  
(0.456)	  
	  
(1.018)	  
	  
(0.908)	  	  
Partner	  director	  busyness	   0.452	  **	   0.472	  **	   0.451	  **	   0.220	  
	  
0.714	  *	  
	  	   (0.196)	  
	  
(0.202)	  
	  
(0.203)	  
	  
(0.323)	  
	  
(0.367)	  	  
Partner	  acquisition	  experience	   0.288	  ***	   0.255	  **	   0.253	  **	   0.680	  ***	   -­‐0.389	  	  
	  	   (0.111)	  
	  
(0.111)	  
	  
(0.114)	  
	  
(0.229)	  
	  
(0.251)	  	  
Dyad,	  Firm,	  Partner,	  Industry	  FE	   Y	  	  	   Y	  	   Y	  	   Y	  	   Y	  	  
Sample	  size	  (firm-­‐partner	  years)	   5626	  
	  
5626	  
	  
5626	  
	  
3420	  
	  
1670	  	  
Model	  Chi2	   187.865	  ***	   185.629	  ***	   218.307	  ***	   110.412	  ***	   135.435	  ***	  
Pseudo	  R2	   0.1527	  	  	   0.1597	  	   0.1810	  	   0.4824	  	   0.2661	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Table 4 
Network	  Closure	  (Ego	  Network	  Level)	  
Dynamic	  Panel	  Estimation,	  robust	  standard	  errors	  (*	  p	  <	  0.10,	  **	  p	  <	  0.05,	  ***	  p	  <	  0.01,	  one	  tailed	  for	  hypotheses)	  
	  	   11	   12	   13	  
	  	   Controls	   Main	  Effects	   Interaction	  
EE	  experience	  X	  ICL	  
	  	   	  
0.082	  **	  
	  	  
	  	   	  
(0.041)	  	  
Indirect	  Competitor	  Links	  (ICL)	  
	  	  
-­‐0.040	  **	   -­‐0.116	  ***	  
	  	  
	  	  
(0.020)	  
	  
(0.040)	  	  
EE	  Experience	  
	  	  
-­‐0.042	  
	  
-­‐0.089	  	  
	  	  
	  	  
(0.063)	  
	  
(0.080)	  	  
Lagged	  closure	   0.558	  ***	   0.350	  ***	   0.366	  ***	  
	  	   (0.160)	  
	  
(0.127)	  
	  
(0.114)	  	  
Relative	  history	   -­‐0.031	  ***	   -­‐0.033	  ***	   -­‐0.018	  **	  
	  	   (0.011)	  
	  
(0.009)	  
	  
(0.008)	  	  
Firm	  degree	  centrality	   0.006	  *	   0.001	  
	  
-­‐0.002	  	  
	  	   (0.003)	  
	  
(0.003)	  
	  
(0.003)	  	  
Partners'	  degree	  centrality	  (mean)	   -­‐0.001	  
	  
-­‐0.001	  
	  
-­‐0.000	  	  
	  	   (0.005)	  
	  
(0.006)	  
	  
(0.005)	  	  
EE	  experience	  difference	  (mean)	   0.004	  
	  
0.015	  
	  
0.007	  	  
	  	   (0.007)	  
	  
(0.016)	  
	  
(0.020)	  	  
Firm	  profitability	   0.127	  
	  
0.121	  
	  
0.179	  	  
	  	   (0.296)	  
	  
(0.263)	  
	  
(0.207)	  	  
Firm	  foreign	  sales	   0.219	  
	  
0.213	  
	  
0.239	  *	  
	  	   (0.168)	  
	  
(0.140)	  
	  
(0.130)	  	  
Firm	  stock	  option	  experience	   0.042	  
	  
0.041	  
	  
0.019	  	  
	  	   (0.041)	  
	  
(0.045)	  
	  
(0.040)	  	  
Firm	  CEOs	  on	  board	   -­‐0.004	  
	  
-­‐0.008	  
	  
-­‐0.001	  	  
	  	   (0.009)	  
	  
(0.010)	  
	  
(0.010)	  	  
Firm	  equity	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	   -­‐0.012	  
	  
-­‐0.035	  
	  
-­‐0.191	  **	  
	  	   (0.067)	  
	  
(0.093)	  
	  
(0.084)	  	  
Firm	  equity	  owned	  in	  other	  firms	   0.069	  
	  
0.033	  
	  
0.054	  	  
	  	   (0.100)	  
	  
(0.098)	  
	  
(0.088)	  	  
Firm	  director	  busyness	   -­‐0.071	  
	  
-­‐0.099	  *	   -­‐0.082	  	  
	  	   (0.058)	  
	  
(0.052)	  
	  
(0.054)	  	  
Firm	  acquisition	  experience	   0.022	  
	  
0.000	  
	  
-­‐0.006	  	  
	  	   (0.028)	  
	  
(0.023)	  
	  
(0.020)	  	  
Partner's	  profitability	  (mean)	   0.289	  
	  
0.468	  
	  
0.292	  	  
	  	   (0.529)	  
	  
(0.467)	  
	  
(0.407)	  	  
Partners'	  foreign	  sales	  (mean)	   -­‐0.004	  
	  
-­‐0.144	  
	  
-­‐0.152	  	  
	  	   (0.289)	  
	  
(0.263)	  
	  
(0.228)	  	  
Partners'	  EE	  experience	  (mean)	   0.004	  
	  
0.024	  
	  
0.017	  	  
	  	   (0.015)	  
	  
(0.017)	  
	  
(0.018)	  	  
Partners'	  CEOs	  on	  board	  (mean)	   0.041	  
	  
0.025	  
	  
0.019	  	  
	  	   (0.030)	  
	  
(0.031)	  
	  
(0.028)	  	  
Partners'	  equity	  owned	  by	  other	  firms	   -­‐0.196	  
	  
-­‐0.122	  
	  
-­‐0.108	  	  
	  	  	  (mean)	   (0.194)	  
	  
(0.163)	  
	  
(0.150)	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Partners'	  equity	  owned	  in	  other	  firms	   0.041	  
	  
-­‐0.253	  
	  
-­‐0.123	  	  
	  	  	  (mean	   (0.187)	  
	  
(0.196)	  
	  
(0.199)	  	  
Partners'	  director	  busyness	  (mean)	   0.015	  
	  
-­‐0.013	  
	  
-­‐0.028	  	  
	  	   (0.115)	  
	  
(0.106)	  
	  
(0.098)	  	  
Partners'	  acquisition	  experience	  (mean)	   -­‐0.023	  
	  
-­‐0.016	  
	  
-­‐0.027	  	  
	  	   (0.038)	  
	  
(0.048)	  
	  
(0.047)	  	  
Same	  industry	  partners	  (%)	   -­‐0.001	  
	  
-­‐0.000	  
	  
-­‐0.001	  	  
	  	   (0.002)	  
	  
(0.001)	  
	  
(0.001)	  	  
Firm,	  Industry,	  Year	  FE	   Y	  
	  
Y	  
	  
Y	  	  
Constant	   0.167	  
	  
0.422	  
	  
0.543	  *	  
	  	   (0.287)	  	  	   (0.303)	  	   (0.281)	  	  
Sample	  size	  (firm-­‐years)	   803	  
	  
803	  
	  
803	  	  
Firms	  in	  sample	   71	  
	  
71	  
	  
71	  	  
AR1	  test	   -­‐3.755	  **	   -­‐4.049	  **	   -­‐4.141	  **	  
AR2	  test	   1.064	  
	  
0.635	  
	  
0.632	  	  
Model	  Chi2	   68.218	  ***	   120.550	  ***	   186.713	  ***	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